



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
1.	1	USN	M				GENERAL COMMENT: We need to be careful in how we refer to the combatant commander throughout the text. Often time the guidance/information we are outlining applies to all JFC but the writing style infers (or states outright) that it applies to the combatant commander.	Style and intent	Noted No global search and replace. This was addressed individually below on a case by case basis.
2.	1	J-5	S	0			Change the title of the pub to “Interagency/ <u>Multilateral</u> Coordination During Joint Operations” JP 3-16 covers multi-national	The name change recommendation is more reflective of the contents of the publication especially Vol II. When you speak interagency it normally refers to the agencies of the USG. Vol II talks about all types of agencies that cross international boundaries.	OBE DOS PM/CPP 1 below
3.	1	NORAD	A	0			Change all “Department of ...” acronyms to have a lower case “o” (e.g. change DOD to DoD, DOS to DoS, etc.).	Accuracy	R Per JP 1-02
4.	1	DOS PM/CPP	S	0			Recommend title change: <u>Coordination with US Government, Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations</u> Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations M – Interagency, <u>Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization</u> Coordination During Joint Operations	“Interagency” refers only to activities between agencies within the USG.	M
5.	2	DOS PM/CPP	S	0			Recommend replacing all instances of “International Organization” with “Intergovernmental Organization” and “IO” with “IGO”	IO refers to any institution that operates in more than one country, meaning that some NGOs are also IOs. As used in this Pub, IO actually refers to an IGO. See corresponding recommendation in glossary.	A
6.	1	NORTHCOM JSP	C	0			Throughout the documents, the term “Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities (MACA)” should be replaced with “Civil Support”.	This reflects emerging terminology as identified in the draft Joint Operating Concept for Homeland Security and draft 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.	A

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7.	2	NORTHCOM J5P	C	0			Throughout the documents, the terms “USACOM or US Atlantic Command” should be replaced with USNORTHCOM or US Northern Command.	USACOM does not exist anymore. It was replaced and redesignated as USNORTHCOM.	A
8.	3	NORTHCOM J5P	C	0			Throughout the documents, the terms “CINC or Commander In Chief” should be replaced with COCOM or Combatant Commander.	Per the verbal guidance from the SecDef, the term CINC refers to the President only.	M – use combatant commander in all of these cases. Do NOT use COCOM.
9.	4	NORTHCOM J5P	C	0			Throughout the documents, the term “DOMS” should be replaced with JDOMS or Joint Director of Military Support.	The DOMS office at the Pentagon has been redesignated as JDOMS.	A
10.	1	USAF	S	0	N/A	N/A	JP 3-08 contains no direct references to JP 3-26.	JP 3-26 provides further detail on Homeland Security doctrine. This topic is referred to in JP 3-08 but does not indicate the existence of a Joint Pub about HS. In contrast, JP 3-26 contains multiple references to JP 3-08.	A Added by USN comment 14
11.	2	USAF	S	0	N/A	N/A	The acronym “FRP” (Federal Response Plan) is referenced throughout the pub and needs to be changed to “NRP” (National Response Plan).	Correctness	R – NRP not approved yet. The INRP is approved and it leaves the FRP in force except as modified by the INRP.
12.	2	USN	M	0.01		1.10	Change as follows: 1. Scope This volume discusses the interagency environment and describes <u>provides fundamental principles and joint doctrine to best achieve facilitate</u> coordination between the combatant commands <u>the Armed Forces of the United States, of the Department of Defense and other agencies of the US Government</u> <u>agencies, intergovernmental organization</u>	Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term. Simplifies text and makes it more consistent with other JPs and JP 1-01 guidance.	A

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							<p>(IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and regional security organizations, and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations. It provides potential methodologies to synchronize successful interagency operations. Volume II describes the key US Government departments and agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations IGOs and NGOs— their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.</p>	<p>The concept of unified action is addressed in JP 3-0:</p> <p>“The concept of unified action . . . highlights the synergistic application of all the instruments of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.”</p> <p>It does not provide methodologies to synchronize successful interagency operations (again an undefined term).</p> <p>Question – do we really discuss the interagency environment?</p>	
13.	2	DOS PRM/AFR	A	0.01	1	3	“...interagency and international operations.	Again to make more clear that we are talking about several levels of coordination.	R – we aren’t using either interagency operation as a term OR international operation. Both are undefined.
14.	3	DOS PRM/AFR	A	0.01	2	3	“joint operations” (i.e.,xxxxxxx)–	Presumably the military readers know what is meant by “joint operations, but it is not entirely clear to me from the context whether “joint” is somehow different from multinational etc. operations.....	R – joint is well-defined for our audience.

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15.	1	DOS PRM/AFR	A	0.01	1	3.0	“between DOD.... and agencies of the U.S. Government as well as with non-governmental, regional security, and international organizations during unified actions.....”	Would make clearer that we are talking about both internal USG coordination and USG coordination with non-USG entities.	OBE USN 2
16.	3	DOS PM/PPP	S	0.01	1	3.06	This volume discusses the interagency, Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) and Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) environments, and describes joint doctrine to best achieve coordination between the combatant commands of the Department of Defense and agencies of the US Government, NGOs nongovernmental, and regional security, and international organizations IGOs during unified actions and joint operations.	Consistent with Comments 1 & 2.	OBE USN 2
17.	3	USAF	S	0.01	1	6.07	Change to read: "...It provides potential methodologies to <u>coordinate and integrate</u> synchronize successful interagency operations..." This change is also required in the “Preface” to Volume II of this JP.	Better choice of words.	OBE USN - 2
18.	4	DOS PM/PPP	S	0.01	1	6.07	It provides potential methodologies to synchronize successful interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> operations.	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
19.	4	DOS PRM/AFR	S	0.01	3(b)	8	“Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.”	The part about multilateral and following procedures ratified by the U.S. seems to suggest that the doctrine in this publication does NOT apply to multinational operations. I am guessing that the idea is to have BOTH this publication and the international procedures apply, no?	R. Standard JP boilerplate. The intent is to tell folks to follow ratified multinational doctrine. That doesn’t mean that we won’t/cannot follow US joint doctrine as well. If there’s a contradiction it helps

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									to remember that BOTH doctrines are “authoritative but require judgment in application.” Neither is prescriptive. The JFC will make the call in those relatively rare instances where there’s a contradiction or problem.
20.	3	USN	M	0.01		15.17	Change as follows: It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for <u>interagency coordination and</u> US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations.	Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term Consistency with previous NWDC/USN comments on text for JP PREFACE(s)	A
21.	5	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.01	2	15.17	It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> operations.	Consistent with Comment 1. JP3-16 deals with multinational (i.e. coalition) operations.	A
22.	4	USN	S	0.01		33.35	Change as follows: The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTFP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances	Not required Consistent with other NWDC/USN comments on text	A

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							dictate otherwise.	for JP PREFACE(s)	
23.	6	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		8	INTRODUCTION TO INTERAGENCY, <u>NGO AND IGO</u> COORDINATION	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
24.	5	USN	M	0.05		10	Change as follows: The Purpose of Interagency Coordination and Operations	Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term	A
25.	7	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		10	The Purpose of Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Coordination and Operations	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
26.	6	USN	M	0.05		11	Change as follows: Synchronizing Coordinating Interagency Operations Efforts	Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term	A
27.	8	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		11	Synchronizing Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Operations	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
28.	9	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		12.13	The Evolving Role of the Armed Forces of the United States Within the Interagency Process Growing Requirement for Integrated <u>USG, NGO and IGO Operations</u> M The Evolving Role of the Armed Forces of the United States Within the Interagency Process Growing Requirement for <u>Close USG, NGO and IGO Coordination</u>	Consistent with recommended change to this paragraph in the main text (page 1.05)	M – we cannot integrate our ops with those of NGOs
29.	10	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		17	The Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Environments	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
30.	11	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		18	Building Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Coordination	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
31.	12	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		19	Media Impact on Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Coordination	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
32.	13	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		22	ESTABLISHED INTERAGENCY, <u>NGO AND IGO</u> RELATIONSHIPS	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
33.	14	DOS PM/CPP	A	0.05		27	Federal Interagency Coordination: Coordination of Domestic Operations with Federal Authorities	Parallels title of next section (line 28)	
34.	15	DOS PM/CPP	A	0.05		28	Department of Defense Coordination of Domestic Operations with State and Local Authorities	Brevity. DOD is implicit.	
35.	16	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		34	The Role of Global and Regional International Intergovernmental Organizations	Consistent with Comment 2.	
36.	17	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		37	ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY, <u>NGO AND IGO OPERATIONS</u> <u>COORDINATION</u>	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
37.	18	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		40	Interagency, NGO and IGO Crisis Response: Domestic Operations	Consistent with Comment 1.	
38.	19	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.05		41	Interagency, NGO and IGO Crisis Response: Foreign Operations	Consistent with Comment 1.	
39.	20	DOS	S	0.06		4	Interagency, NGO and IGO Information Management	Consistent with Comment 1.	

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		PM/CPP							
40.	21	DOS PM/CPP	S	0.06		5	Interagency Training and Readiness	Consistent with Comment 1.	
41.	5	DOS PRM/AFR	M	0.06		24	United States Government Agency for International Development /Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Response Team.	USAID has agreed that DARTs are really USG vice USAID teams in that they most often involve team members from various USG agencies.	A
42.	7	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.01	1.a			I think it would be useful perhaps to distinguish somehow between “inter-agency” in the context of among USG agencies that at the end of the day answer to one national authority and “inter-agency” in the context of USG agencies including DOD interacting with IOs and NGOs that do not report to/are not guided by the same authority – more asymmetrical relationships. We do not want to imply that DOD controls or is controlled by those other entities.	A. The IGO for IO fix should help make that distinction clearer, together with the rewritten interagency definition.
43.	22	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.01		0	INTRODUCTION TO INTERAGENCY, <u>NGO AND IGO</u> COORDINATION	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
44.	6	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.01	New 1	13.14	“..localities or foreign countries <u>and/or non-governmental and international organizations.</u>	One of the purposes of this doctored, I think, is to signal where there will be other than DOD/other than USG players – and it is not just governmental authorities but also the IOs/NGOs.	R – cannot change a quote/lift from another pub.
45.	7	USN	M	1.01		20	Change as follows: 1. The Purpose of Interagency Coordination and Operations	Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term	A
46.	23	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.01	1	20	The Purpose of Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Coordination and Operations	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
47.	24	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.01	1a	22.34	Interagency coordination is a process that brings together agencies, departments, and organizations. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines	Consistent with Comment 1.	A

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							“interagency coordination” as follows: “Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged agencies of the US Government (USG), including the Department of Defense, agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.” Similarly, in the context of Department of Defense (DOD) involvement, NGO and IGO coordination refer to coordination between elements of DOD and nongovernmental or intergovernmental organizations to achieve an objective.		
48.	8	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.01	1b.	43.45	“The integration of <u>US</u> political and military....”	Since we are talking about international operations in part here, it would be useful to specify what is USG and what might be other parties’ interests.	A
49.	25	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.01 to 1.02	1b	45 to 3	<p>The changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the growth of pluralistic governments <u>failed states, increasing weapons proliferation</u>, global terrorism, and unconventional threats to US citizens, interests, and territory territories, requires even greater cooperation during interagency operations.</p> <p>M - The changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the growth of pluralistic governments <u>failed states, increasing weapons proliferation</u>, global terrorism, and unconventional threats to US citizens, interests, and territory territories, requires even greater cooperation during interagency operations. <u>Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military elements of power supported by and coordinated with that of our Allies and various nongovernmental, international, and regional security organizations.</u></p>	Don’t know what was intended here, but pluralism is generally a good thing.	M
50.	9	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.02	1	1	...pluralistic governments.... ??	Pluralistic governments – as opposed to dictatorial, non-representative ones – are generally seen as a positive so it seems odd that this is included in a list of essentially negative items???	OBE by DOS PM/PPP 25
51.	1	USMC	S	1.02		2.03	Change to read: “...and territories, requires even greater	Correct terminology.	OBE

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							cooperation during interagency coordination operations.”		USN - 8
52.	1	USA	S	1.02		2.03	Recommend the following phrase be changed as depicted: “. . . requires even greater cooperation during interagency coordination operations.”	Interagency agency operations are not defined.	OBE USN - 8
53.	11	USN	M	1.02		5.07	Change as follows: Military operations must be coordinated with those the <u>activities</u> of other agencies of the United States Government (USG), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs,) regional security organizations, international organizations (IOs), as well as with the operations of foreign forces <u>and the activities of various host nation (HN) agencies.</u>	More accurate and consistent with previously used verbiage We can not overlook the HN	A
54.	26	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.02	1c	5.07	Military operations must be coordinated with those of other USG agencies of the United States Government (USG), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs and ,) regional security organizations, international organizations (IOs), as well as with foreign forces.	Consistent with previous comments.	OBE by USN 11
55.	10	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.02	1c.	5.07	“U.S. military operations must be coordinated with those the endeavors of other agencies of”	Need to separate grammatically AND substance-wise the USG military efforts and non-military efforts of other USG as well as entities outside of the USG...	OBE by USN 11
56.	1	J8 FD Dr. M.F. Altfeld 614-9754	A	1.02		7	When the authors refer to “International Organizations,” they need to make clear whether they are referring to International GOVERNMENTAL Organizations (IGOs), International NON-GOVERNMENTAL Organizations (NGOs), or BOTH, and WHY. Further, these terms need to be defined before they are used or, at least, upon their first usage.	As currently written (and this is true passim), it is difficult to tell just what types of international organizations are being referred to at each point in the book. This would not be a problem if the authors did not differentiate as to how we cooperated with IGOs and NGOs, but they seem to do so. Thus, it is important to know which types are being referred to. Further, this need to differentiate is not helped by the use of the term “IO,” which inherently does NOT differentiate between IGOs and NGOs. All of this leaves the reader quite confused.	OBE by various comments that neck down the definition of interagency and substitute IGO for IO.
57.	27	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.02	1c	7.09	A joint force commander (JFC) must be able to call upon the capabilities of integrate his operations with all the	Sometimes the JFC draws on the capabilities of other	M – “integrate”

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							<p>aforementioned agencies and organizations.</p> <p>Modify as follows: A joint force commander (JFC) must be able to call upon the capabilities of integrate his operations with all the aforementioned agencies and organizations. <u>Sometimes the JFC draws on the capabilities of other organizations, sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations, and sometimes the JFC merely deconflicts his activities with those of others.</u></p>	<p>organizations, sometimes he provides capabilities to other organizations, and sometimes he merely deconflicts his activities with those of others.</p>	<p>has a certain connotation within joint doctrine. However, your rationale statement is far preferable and will put in the pub for the next draft.</p>
58.	11	DOS PRM/AFR	C	1.02	1c.	7.09	A JFC must be able to call upon.....	<p>Either delete this sentence or modify it to show that a Force Commander should collaborate with other entities in order to maximize his/her efforts/assets. A JFC does NOT/NOT control other entities.</p>	OBE by DOS PM/CPP 27
59.	12	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.02	1c.	12.14	<p><u>“...U.S. state and local governments, and overseas with the U.S. Chief of Mission and Country Team in a U.S. embassy...”</u></p>	<p>Need to clearly separate domestic and foreign operations. Note that the last part of that para uses “inter-agency” in the context of within the USG only (which is fine)</p>	A
60.	28	DOS PM/CPP	A	1.02	1c	19.21	Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military, and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of the USG <u>national power</u> .	Clarity	A
61.	9	USN	S	1.02		21.22	<p>Change as follows: Successful interagency coordination enables the US to mount coherent, efficient, and collective operations is essential for unified action and facilitates economy of force and unity of effort.</p>	<p>Verbiage incorporates JP 3-0 thoughts regarding unified action and Principles of War.</p>	R
62.	29	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.02	1c	21.22	<p>Successful interagency <u>NGO and IGO</u> coordination enables the USG to <u>build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international goals.</u> mount coherent, efficient, and collective operations.</p>	<p>Reinforces distinction between coordinating with USG and non-USG agencies..</p>	A
63.	2	J8 FD	A	1.02		22	I believe that the use of the word “collective” is	Grammar.	OBE

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							grammatically incorrect here. Try “Comprehensive.”		DOS PM/CPP 29
64.	10	USN	M	1.02		29	Change as follows: Synchronizing <u>Coordinating</u> Interagency Efforts Operations	Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term Consistency with previous verbiage	A
65.	1	EUCOM	S	1.02	2	29	Rename paragraph title as follows: “ Synchronizing <u>Coordinating</u> Interagency Operations”	Correspond with previous corrections throughout paragraph where synchronization was replaced with coordination.	OBE USN 10
66.	30	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.02	2	29	Synchronizing Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Operations	Consistent with Comment 1.	
67.	2	USA	S	1.02		31.32	Change as follows: “A common thread throughout all major operations, whether in war or military operations other than war (MOOTW) across the range of military operations, is the involvement of a broad range <u>large number</u> of agencies and organizations --”	Gets rid of MOOTW and uses the more acceptable ROMO phrase.	A
68.	31	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.02	2b	41.45	Increasingly, participants also include state and local agencies, additional USG agencies, coalition partners, NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (<u>CARE</u>), regional security IGOs organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), IOs such as and the United Nations (UN), and the agencies of the host nation (HN). M – Increasingly, participants also include state and local agencies, additional USG agencies, coalition partners, NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (<u>CARE</u>), regional security IGOs organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), IOs such as and the United Nations (UN), and the agencies of the host nation (HN) .	Clarity; consistency with Comment 2.	M – HN abbreviation previously established.
69.	13	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.02	2.b	42.43	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere CARE/ include ICRC under IOs	I think CARE no longer uses the expansion and most people do not know it anyway. Maybe list some religious NGOs also? I would also mention the International Red Cross Movement.	OBE DOS PM/CPP 31
70.	3	J8 FD	A	1.02		44	Replace “IO” with “IGO”	Accuracy. Of course the UN is an	A

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								IO. But, specifically, it is an IGO. If the distinction between IGOs and NGOs is at all important for how we coordinate our operations, then the authors should maintain this distinction throughout the body of the text. Not to do so is simply sloppy writing and, more importantly, will confuse the reader.	
71.	32	DOS PM/CP	S	1.03	2b(1)	1	The complex nature of interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> operations requires that commanders...	Consistent with Comment 1	A
72.	12	USN	S	1.03		1.17	GENERAL COMMENT: I don't see much difference between the 2 subparagraphs. Lines 1-3 are very similar with lines 14-17. What is the focus of each and how does it relate to or support the main paragraph (b. The Military component) or the main overarching paragraph (2. Synchronizing Interagency Efforts)? M – Delete lines 1-3.		M
73.	33	DOS PM/CP	S	1.03	2b(1)	5.08	Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, campaign or operation plans must be crafted to leverage <u>utilize</u> the core competencies of the myriad agencies, coordinating their military efforts and resources with military capabilities those of other agencies toward to achieve the identified end state. M- Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, campaign or operation plans must be crafted to leverage <u>recognize</u> the core competencies of the myriad agencies, coordinating their military efforts and resources with military capabilities those of other agencies toward to achieve the identified end state.	Coordination is something you do with other agencies, not to them.	M
74.	4	J8 FD	A	1.03		25	Replace “ each USG, state or local agency... ” with “ <u>Each U.S. Federal, State and Local agency...</u> ”	Grammatical accuracy	A Adds Federal
75.	34	DOS PM/CP	S	1.03	2c	25.28	Each USG, state or local agency, NGO, and <u>IGO</u> brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the task of coordination interagency table . The military also	Consistent with Comment 1	M – incorporate s J-8 FD

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							brings its own organizational dynamics, characteristics, ideas, and values to interagency operations. M – Each USG, federal , state or local agency, NGO, and IGO brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the task of coordination interagency table . The military also brings its own organizational dynamics, characteristics, ideas, and values to interagency operations.		comment
76.	35	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.03	2c	28	This diversity is a the strength of the interagency process.	Accuracy	A
77.	36	DOS PM/CPP	A	1.03	2c	29.30	In one coordinated collective forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.	Avoid word repetition.	A
78.	14	DOS PRM/AFR	M	1.03	2c.	29.30	One coordinated forum	There is no such thing as one coordinated forum – not even within the USG and certainly not internationally. Rather, ad hoc coordinating mechanisms that replicate past operations are set up as required. It does not help the military planners to be led to think that there is one stop shopping on international coordination; they will just get frustrated!	A but OBE by DOS PM/CPP comment.
79.	5	J8 FD	A	1.03	d	32	Re-write this section as follows (I've salvaged as much as I can of what has already been written): "The challenge to the nation's leadership, commanders at all levels, and the civilian leadership of agencies and organizations, during a period of great instability and uncertainty in the international political and military order, when threats to U.S. interests and allies may be less foreseeable and more frequent, is to develop a process by which the resources available can be properly allocated, in the mixes necessary to solve military and other foreign policy problems quickly and comprehensively, while leaving as many resources as possible remaining to deal with unforeseen future problems."	Clarity, Accuracy. As currently written, this section is confused, confusing and inaccurate. The re-write I have provided states clearly the "fundamental problem" facing any nation whose resources are not infinite, but whose leaders would like, nonetheless, to be able to act to protect their people in a dangerous and uncertain world.	R – the rewrite doesn't capture all of the thoughts in para d. It focuses exclusively on the issue of resource allocation. Intend to use part of this input to modify the

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									EUCOM 6 comment below.
80.	37	DOS PM/PPP	A	1.03	2d	32.33	The challenge, to the nation's leadership, commanders at all levels, and the civilian leadership of <u>USG</u> agencies and organizations, during a...	Clarity	OBE by mod to EUCOM comment 6
81.	6	EUCOM	A	1.03	2.d	32.37	<p>Change: "The challenge, to the nation's leadership, commanders at all levels, and the civilian leadership of agencies and organizations, during a period in history when challenges to the US and its interests are becoming more frequent and complex, is to recognize what resources are available to address a problem and how to work together to effectively apply them."</p> <p>To Read: "We are in a period of history where there are several strains on the US and its interests that are becoming more frequent and complex. The challenge to our nation's leadership, commanders at all levels, and the civilian leadership of agencies and organizations is to recognize what resources are available to address a problem and how to work together to effectively apply them."</p> <p>M – During this period of great instability and uncertainty the challenge to our nation's leadership, commanders at all levels, and the civilian leadership of agencies and organizations is to recognize what resources are available and how to work together to effectively apply them.</p>	<p>The use of challenge and challenges confuses the reader in the run on sentence. Break up the sentence to clarify.</p> <p>We are in a period of history where there are several strains on challenges to the US and its interests that are becoming more frequent and complex. The challenge to responsibility of our nation's leadership, commanders at all levels, and the civilian leadership of agencies and organizations is to recognize what resources are available to address a problem and how to work together to effectively apply them</p>	M
82.	38	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.03	2d	37	<p>Despite <u>potential</u> philosophical and operational differences, all efforts must be...</p> <p>M – Despite <u>potential</u> philosophical and operational differences, all efforts must be coordinated to create an atmosphere of cooperation that ultimately contributes to <u>national</u> unity of effort.</p>	Dampen expectations for conflict with other USG agencies.	M
83.	39	DOS PM/PPP	A	1.03	2d	39.41	Therefore, pursuit of interagency coordination and cooperation as a process should be viewed as a means, not an end to mission accomplishment, <u>not an end in itself</u> .	Sentence flow.	A
84.	7	EUCOM	A	1.03	2.d	41	Add a space between "anend" to make it "an end"	Typo	OBE

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
									See above
85.	10	EUCOM	A	1.03	2.d.	41	Rewrite sentence to read as follows: "Therefore, pursuit of interagency coordination and cooperation as a process should be viewed as a means, not an end as an end, to mission accomplishment."	Correct misspelling and improve parallelism within sentence.	OBE by DOS PM/CPP 39
86.	15	DOS PRM/AFR	A	1.03	2d.	41	an end (needs a space between the two words		OBE by DOS PM/CPP 39
87.	4	USAF	A	1.03	d	41	Change to read, ". . . viewed as a means, not an end <u>an end</u> . . ."	Correctness.	OBE by DOS PM/CPP 39
88.	40	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.04	2e	1.02	<u>Within</u> t The USG, the National Security Strategy (NSS) guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power...	Distinguish that the NSS does not apply to NGOs or IGOs.	A
89.	3	USA	S	1.04		17	Add the following: "... homeland. <u>Achieving this coordinated and focused effort entails both DOD lead homeland defense and non-DOD lead civil support missions. Within the civil support arena</u> Additionally federal law, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) <u>(to be replaced by the National Response Plan)</u> , and"	Expands the discussion to include homeland defense. As depicted, it only reflected the civil support portion of homeland security.	M Need to recognize the approved INRP.
							M Add the following: "... homeland. <u>Achieving this coordinated and focused effort entails both DOD lead homeland defense and non-DOD lead civil support missions. Within the civil support arena</u> Additionally federal law, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) <u>(as modified by the Initial National Response Plan)</u> , and"		
90.	5	USAF	S	1.04	2f	17	Change to read, "Additionally, federal law, the Federal <u>National</u> Response Plan (F <u>N</u> RP) . . ."	Although the NRP is still in draft, recommend it be referred to in this pub.	OBE by USA comment
91.	14	USN	S	1.04		22	Add: <u>For additional information see the NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY and JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.</u>	Provides additional reference to Pub user facilitating the search for relevant information	A
92.	1	JRO	M	1.04		23	Insert as new paragraph g: " <u>The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States and that we must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions. Three principal pillars are described;</u>	Provides a sketch of a key national strategy not currently included.	M

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							<p><u>counterproliferation to combat use, strengthened nonproliferation to combat proliferation, and consequence management to respond to use.”</u></p> <p>M – Insert as new paragraph g: “<u>The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States and that we must pursue a comprehensive interagency strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.</u>”</p>		
93.	41	DOS PM/CPP	A	1.04	2g	27.30	“... ensure that their joint operations are integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations) and nonmilitary organizations ([US]government agencies such as the Agency for International Development...”	Reinforce that USAID is a USG agency.	A
94.	16	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.04	2g.	29.30	Add U.S. Dept. of State to the list of agencies, also Red Cross to the IOs.	More complete range of players.	R – not meant to be a comprehensive list...
95.	4	USA	S	1.04		32	Delete “, especially during MOOTW,”	MOOTW will likely be written out of the doctrine lexicon with the consolidation of JPs 3-0 and 3-07.	R – removing MOOTW would lose the meaning/intent of the sentence. Need some other solution.
96.	42	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.04	2g	32.34	The extent of NGO <u>and</u> IGO cooperation and coordination with the military will vary and will be contingent on the nature of the mission and US military’s role in that operation (belligerent, peacekeeper, provider of aid.)	Statement applies also to IGOs.	A
97.	43	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.05	3	21.47	<p>Recommend completely replacing Paragraph 3, sub-paragraphs a, b, c, d and e with the text below:</p> <p><u>3. The Growing Requirement for Close Integrated USG, NGO and IGO Operations</u>Coordination. The number of ongoing</p>	I believe the point of the section is to detail why integrated USG, NGO and IGO operations have become and will continue to be	M – (we’re accepting this large change in its entirety

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p><u>and potential operations requiring integrated US interagency, NGO and IGO activities has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Moreover, given the nature of the challenges facing the US and the international community, this trend is likely to continue. Several factors contribute to this increasing need for integrated operations.</u></p> <p><u>a. Although the number of ongoing conflicts worldwide has declined somewhat since the end of the Cold War, the opportunity to intervene in these crises has greatly expanded. During the Cold War, ideological divisions prevented the UN and other actors from stepping in to prevent or end conflicts that were often proxies for superpower competition. With the end of this bipolar world system, however, the UN and other organizations have instituted record numbers of peace operations (POs) and CCOs. In order to resolve these crises, such operations inevitably require close cooperation between various organizations that contribute military, humanitarian, political, economic and other forms of expertise and resources.</u></p> <p><u>c. Not only have opportunities for intervention expanded, but the USG, specifically, has increasingly chosen to participate in these operations. In part, this is due to the effects of “globalization,” i.e. the rapid expansion of international trade, communications, travel and other technologies that mean the US economy, security and political interests are increasingly implicated by events virtually anywhere in the world. Because these events are almost inevitably multi-faceted, USG interventions must effectively integrate the activities of multiple agencies in order to address them.</u></p> <p><u>d. The increasing threat posed by global terrorism has also necessitated a more proactive approach to foreign operations, as well as greater interagency coordination. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 notes that the US is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones that willingly or unwittingly provide a haven for terrorists. The terrorist threat is further compounded by state sponsors of terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missile technology to deliver them over long distances. Meeting these challenges requires the integration of all elements of US national power – economic</u></p>	<p>increasingly necessary. If correct, I believe the inserted text is better. If not, what is this section really supposed to be about?</p>	<p>with one small modification to the title of the para at the beginning. We cannot integrate our ops with those of NGOs.</p> <p>M – Mod 2 See USN #1A below</p>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p><u>efforts to cut off terrorist financing, diplomatic initiatives to eliminate terrorists' political support, informational activities to combat extremist ideologies, and military operations to take direct action against identified threats.</u></p> <p><u>e. The need for coordinated US interagency operations is also being recognized and institutionalized at the national level. USG agencies – just like the separate military services – achieve national objectives more effectively and efficiently when their operations are synchronized as part of a coherent, unified effort. In the 1990s, this insight led to the promulgation of two Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) that established procedures for interagency coordination and decision-making specifically for peacekeeping and complex crisis operations. PDD-25 established criteria for US support to peacekeeping operations and delineated the responsibilities of DOD and DOS. PDD-56 created an interagency planning process for use in developing and implementing integrated USG responses to complex contingencies. Although both of these documents became invalid upon the change of presidential administrations in 2001, they have had a significant impact on the way the USG approaches interagency operations. In addition, a successor National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) to PDD-56 is currently in draft.</u></p>		
98.	1A	USN	M	1.05		22	<p>a. Although the number of ongoing conflicts worldwide has declined somewhat since the end of the Cold War, the opportunity to intervene in these crises has greatly expanded. During the Cold War, ideological divisions prevented the UN and other actors from stepping in to prevent or end conflicts that were often proxies for superpower competition. With the end of this bipolar world system, however, the UN and other organizations have instituted record numbers of peace operations (POs) and CCOs. In order to resolve these crises, such operations inevitably require close cooperation between various organizations that contribute military, humanitarian, political, economic and other forms of expertise and resources.</p> <p>b. Not only have opportunities for intervention expanded, but the USG, specifically, has increasingly chosen to participate in these operations. In part, this is due to the effects of</p>	Arguable. Not necessary.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>“globalization,” i.e., the rapid expansion of international trade, communications, travel and other technologies that mean the US economy, security and political interests are increasingly implicated by events virtually anywhere in the world. Because these events are almost inevitably multi-faceted, USG interventions must effectively integrate the activities of multiple agencies in order to address them.</p> <p>e. The increasing threat posed by global terrorism has also necessitated a more proactive approach to foreign operations, as well as greater interagency coordination. The National Security Strategy of ...</p>		
99.	17	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.05	3b	33.34	“Federal Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and disaster relief” and humanitarian operations.	FHA is not a common term.	OBE by DOS PM/CPP 43
100.	18	DOS PRM/AFR	M	1.05	3b	40	...more IOs NGOs are active in the business	We have the same IOs as always – more NGOs	OBE by DOS PM/CPP 43
101.	19	DOS PRM/AFR	S	1.06	3 d		Delete the part about the two PDDs that have been superseded so as not to confuse the reader		OBE by DOS PM/CPP 43
102.	6	USAF	A	1.06	3d	13.15	d. Two Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs): <u>PDD 25, Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, (May 1994)</u> ; and <u>PDD 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, (May 1997)</u> , established the framework for how the USG would respond to CCO.	Completeness. Accuracy. Clarity. Identifies the PDDs by name and date.	OBE by DOS PM/CPP 43
103.	5	USA	A	1.06	3.d.	13.26	General Comment. This paragraph notes that NSPD-1 superseded PDD-56 and other related PDDs, yet further discussions on page I-9 include detailed paragraphs on PDD-25 and PDD-56 and the section on NSPD-1 on page I-10 was deleted. This does not make sense unless it is provided for historical background only. If NSPD-1 superseded the other PDDs, then why focus on the old ones.	Correctness. Need to refer to current directives in effect.	OBE by DOS PM/CPP 43
104.	2A	USN	M	1.06		20	Within the USG, the Armed Forces and other USG agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles with other commands and agencies. <u>However, this is not the support command relationship. Relationships between the joint force and other government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the command and control (C2) of a military operation.</u>	Correctness.	A

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105.	17	USN	M	1.06		28.29	Delete: e. The US has a greater depth and array of both people and equipment resources than other countries.	As written provides no useful or relevant information	OBE by DOS PM/CPP 43
106.	16	USN	M	1.06 to 1.08	4	36	GENERAL COMMENT: What is the value/relevance of this paragraph (Command Relationships)? It seems to be the standard pitch, already repeated in too many JPs. How is it relevant to interagency coordination? Subparagraph 4.c. seems to be the only one containing any relevant material but it is limited in that it only addresses NGOs. It also contains reference to interagency operations – a term we have decided against. We either need to delete this discussion or craft something relevant to the text’s purpose and the objective of this Chapter/section.	Relevance	Noted.
107.	44	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.06	4a	38.39	b. Within the USG, t The Armed Forces and other USG agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles to one another with other commands and agencies. M- a. Within the USG, t The Armed Forces and other USG agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles with other commands and agencies.	Recommend reversing the order of subparagraphs a and b and creating a logical flow from “center” to “periphery” – i.e. DOD, USG, then IGOs and NGOs. DOD is a USG agency.	M
108.	4A	USN	M	1.07		1	b. USG agencies—including DOD—may be placed in supported or supporting relationships with IGOs. Even when placed in a supporting role, however, US military forces always remain under the command authority of the President. In many operations, though, US agencies’ relationship with IGOs is neither supported nor supporting. In such cases, cooperation is voluntary and will be based upon shared goals and good will.	The proper language was inserted above (comment 2).	A
109.	45	DOS PM/CPP	A	1.07	4b	2.04	ab. Within DOD, w When the Secretary of Defense designates supported and supporting command relationships between combatant commanders for the planning and execution of joint operations, supporting DOD agencies are designated as appropriate. M – ab. Within DOD, w When the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) designates supported and supporting command relationships between combatant commanders for the planning and execution of joint operations, supporting DOD agencies are designated as appropriate.	Recommend reversing the order of subparagraphs a and b and creating a logical flow from “center” to “periphery” – i.e. DOD, USG, then IGOs and NGOs.	M – Delete subpara b in its entirety. This is general UNAAF material. (Delete 1.07 line 2 through 1.08 line 3).

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110.	3A	USN	M	1.07		7	NGOs do not operate within military, or the governmental, or IGO's hierarchy. Therefore, the relationship between the Armed Forces and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting.	Point already made above (comment 2).	A
111.	46	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.08	4c	4	<u>c. USG agencies – including DOD – may be placed in supported or supporting relationships with IGOs. Even when placed in a supporting role, however, US military forces always remain under the command authority of the President. In many operations, though, US agencies' relationship with IGOs is neither supported nor supporting. In such cases, cooperation is voluntary and will be based upon shared goals and good will.</u>	Recommend inserting the text at left as subparagraph c and shift current subparagraph down to form subparagraph d. Current three paragraphs do not address command relationships with IGOs.	A
112.	20	DOS PRM/AFR	M	1.08	4c	5	<u>No IOs or NGOs are in any direct command relationship with U.S. military forces. International organizations that are UN agencies normally are coordinated in a country by the Resident UN Coordinator or the head of a UNPKO (normally a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General), though the agencies may enjoy a fair degree of autonomy. NGOs are autonomous agencies that may form coordinative structures in a given situation. As implementing partners of IOs and/or governments, NGOs may to a degree be coordinated by those IOs and/or governments. Where there are side by side peacekeeping and humanitarian programs, there will normally be set up a CMOC to facilitate collaboration.</u>		OBE by DOS PM/PPP 47.
113.	47	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.08	4c	5.12	de. NGOs do not operate within military, or the governmental, UN or IO's hierarchy. Therefore, the relationship between the Armed Forces and NGOs is rarely neither supported nor supporting. As with IGOs, the relationship is usually voluntary, and depends likewise on good will and shared goals. It is possible, however, for the US military to be placed in a supporting role to an NGO – for example to assist the Red Cross in delivering relief supplies during a humanitarian crisis. An associate or partnership relationship may develop during some missions. For example, if the UN has provided a grant to an NGO to implement a project, the NGO would be considered its "implementing partner." If formed, the civil-military operations center (CMOC) is the focal point where US military forces provide coordinated any support to NGOs. As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting role to the military. They may, however, accept grant funding from IGOs or USG agencies like USAID, thereby taking the role of	Shift discussion of NGOs to subparagraph d, thereby preserving logical flow of this section. Believe US military could be placed in a supporting relationship to an NGO, if so tasked by competent US authority. Expanded upon "implementing partner" relationship.	M – Note: need to make a clear distinction between the act of providing support and the support command relationship. DoD may indeed provide support to an NGO

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							<p>“implementing partners.” While this relationship is not so strong as command authority or even a contract, it does give the granting agency oversight authority over how the funds are spent.</p> <p>M – de. NGOs do not operate within military, or the governmental, UN or IO’s hierarchy. Therefore, the relationship between the Armed Forces and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting. An associate or partnership relationship may develop during some missions. For example, if the UN has provided a grant to an NGO to implement a project, the NGO would be considered its “implementing partner.” If formed, the civil-military operations center (CMOC) is the focal point where US military forces provide coordinated any support to NGOs. <u>As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting role to the military. They may, however, accept grant funding from IGOs or USG agencies like USAID, thereby taking the role of “implementing partners.”</u> While this relationship is not so strong as command authority or even a contract, it does give the granting agency oversight authority over how the funds are spent.</p>		
114.	18	USN	M	1.08		19.20	<p>Change as follows: <u>A coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation between the joint force and OGAs, NGOs, and IOs should not be equated to the command and control (C2) of a military operation.</u></p>	<p>More accurate</p> <p>Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term</p>	A
115.	48	DOS PM/CPP	A	1.08	5a	22.25	<p>Military operations depend upon a command structure that may be unfamiliar to or radically is often very different than from that of civilian organizations. These differences between military and civilian command structures may present significant challenges to coordination efforts.</p>	Don’t want to overstate the case.	A
116.	49	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.08	5a	27.28	<p>Still more difficult, sSome NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are purposely explicitly antithetical to <u>those of the USG, and particularly the US military both the military and government agencies.</u></p>	Emphasize that the USG is one team, and that non-USG organizations may oppose US policy, of which the military role is but one part.	A
117.	50	DOS PM/CPP	A	1.08	5b	34.40	<p>b. Interagency processes designed to achieve unity of effort, are often more the result of art than science. The military on the other hand, tends to rely on structured decision-making</p>	Recommend reverse order of first two sentences and redraft first (now second) sentence as at left.	M

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							processes, detailed planning, the use of standardized techniques and procedures, and sophisticated military C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. <u>The equivalent interagency processes, on the other hand, are less clearly defined and reflect more the result of art than science.</u>	Improves paragraph structure and flow.	
							<u>M –</u> b. Interagency processes designed to achieve unity of effort, are often more the result of art than science. The military on the other hand, tends to rely on structured decision-making processes, detailed planning, the use of standardized techniques and procedures, and sophisticated military C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations.		
118.	21	DOS PRM/AFR	M	1.08	5b	39	“...to coordinate and synchronize operations. <u>Civilian agencies similarly employ standardized, methodical decision-making principles but may not have the same degree of internal C2 as does the U.S. military. Across agency lines, IOs and NGOs tend to coordinate because there is a perceived mutually supportive interest, not because of any formalized C2.</u>		A
119.	51	DOS PM/PPP	A	1.08	5b	40.41	<u>As a result, u</u> Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation. M – Unity of effort can only be achieved through c Close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation. All are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives...	Follow-on from previous comment. Improves logical flow of sentences in the paragraph.	M
120.	22	DOS PRM/AFR	M	1.09 to 1.10	5c.	1	These PDDs no longer apply, right? So why go into such detail?		R in favor of DOS PM/PPP approach. As military users we find the clarified material on these two PDDs helpful.
121.	52	DOS	A	1.09	5c	1.06	c. With increased involvement in peacekeeping and	Clarity. Better intro to following	A

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		PM/CPP					humanitarian operations, USG agencies have been significantly shaped by the two PDDs As USG involvement in POs and CCOs increased during the 1990s, the Executive Branch responded by promulgating two PDDs that have significantly shaped subsequent interagency operations:	subparagraphs.	
122.	53	DOS PM/CPP	A	1.09	5c1	8.13	(1) PDD-25, “US Policy – Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” was signed in May 1994 as the result of initiated an interagency review of our nation’s peacekeeping policies and programs. This review aimed to develop a comprehensive peace operations policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period. This policy review has resulted in PDD–25, signed in May 1994.	Reads better.	A
123.	6	USA	S	1.09 1.10		8.44 1.11	On page 1.06, paragraph 3d, line 20, it states “Subsequently, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) –1, Subject: . . . superseded all previous presidential guidance, PDD-56 in particular, and has” If NSPD-1 superseded PDD-25 and 56 (plus others), why are they quoted in detail on page 1.09? Why not a detailed discussion of NSPD-1? Does NSPD-1 use “complex contingency operations?” If not, can we get rid of the term?	Alignment of the text.	R – see series of DOS PM/CPP comments.
124.	54	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.09	5c1b	29.31	(b) PDD–25 therefore, elevated DOD to the status of Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for certain POsUS-supported, UN Chapter VII, peace enforcement missions, thereby requiring it to lead the planning and management of operations that have a strong nonmilitary component, in coordination with operations with other nonmilitary organizations.	Consistent with PDD-25, DOD is the LFA for both UN Chapter VII operations and Chapter VI operations in which US forces participate. Consistent with PDD-25, emphasize the coordination of PO planning and management with other government agencies.	A
125.	55	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.09 to 1.10	5c2	33 to 11	(2) PDD-56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations” (a) PDD-56 was promulgated in May 1997 to address shortcomings in interagency decision-making, doctrine, planning and cooperation that had been identified during previous CCOs. It established mechanisms through which the USG could: determine what, if any, response the USG would take to a given crisis; identify the desired end-state for a CCO; establish an appropriate division of labor between involved USG agencies; and develop an integrated plan for applying all elements of national power to resolve the crisis situation. A key component of this planning effort is the political-military implementation plan (POLMIL plan), which	Recommend replacing all of paragraph (2) and its subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) with the text at left. This better explains PDD-56, its significance, and the current status of its NSPD successor document.	A

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							<p>sets the context for the overall USG effort. A POLMIL plan includes: a situation assessment; delineation of US interests and strategic purpose; a mission statement for the operation; concept of the operation; the tasks and responsibilities of involved USG agencies; individual agency sub-plans; the desired end-state; and an exit strategy.</p> <p>(b) In addition to these planning and decision-making mechanisms, PDD-56 required the USG to conduct after action reviews of interagency performance during CCOs. It also mandated that US agency personnel be trained in CCO management, utilizing coursework and exercises conducted at institutions like the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center.</p> <p>(c) Although PDD-56 is no longer in force, the current administration has drafted, but not yet approved, an NSPD replacement for PDD-56. This draft NSPD reiterates the planning, decision-making, AAR and training mechanisms and requirements established in PDD-56. In addition, it goes on to address proactive mechanisms for anticipating and preventing complex foreign crises before they occur.</p>		
126.	23	DOS PRM/AFR	M	1.11		F1.01	<p>At the tactical level, add U.S. Refugee Coordinator as a player. The UN SRSRG is a Special Rep OF (not to) the SYG.</p> <p>M – At the tactical level (below executive departments and agencies), add “U.S. Refugee Coordinator.” Also, delete Note 6 from the figure.</p>		M
127.	56	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.11		F1.01	Add “Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG) to table under Executive Departments & Agencies column, on Operational row.	Consistent with Chapter II, page 20, paragraph 7.d., which explains this new coordinating body on the combatant commander’s staff.	R – but accept your comment 58 where reference to JIACG is made.
128.	57	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.11		F1.01	3. The Ambassador and Embassy (which includes the country team) function at both the operational and tactical levels by <u>and may supporting</u> joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or CJTF.	Ambassador and country team don’t function at the operational and tactical levels only when supporting joint operational planning.	A
129.	58	DOS	S	1.11		F1.01	4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Foreign	JIACG may include	A

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		PM/CPP					Policy Advisor or Political Advisor assigned to the combatant commander by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any <u>other US agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG) or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander's staff specifically assigned person. Other USG agencies do not have a similar counterpart to the combatant commander.</u>	representatives from several different USG agencies, depending on the combatant commander's mission requirements.	
130.	59	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.11	7	1	7. The Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Environments	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
131.	60	DOS PM/CPP	A	1.12	7a	1.02	The essence of interagency coordination is the effective integration of of multiple agencies with individual <u>their diverse perspectives and</u> agendas.	Disagreement isn't only due to self-interested agendas, but also due to sincere differences of opinion, often based on the organization's mission.	A
132.	6	J8 FD	A	1.12		1.06	This section needs to be re-written to reflect the fact that military organizations ALSO have their own, individual, agendas. EVERYONE is "results oriented." They just want the results to be to the CREDIT of THEIR (agency's, Service's, Department's) unique contribution.	Accuracy	Noted – Request line-in/line-out verbiage from J8
133.	61	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.12	7a	2.04	This process and the divergent agency cultures typically create a challenging environment for achieving unity of effort the results oriented military ethos. <u>create a challenging environment for achieving unity of effort</u>	Comes across as pretty arrogant to presume that only the military is interested in results.	M – delete the entire sentence.
134.	7	USA	A	1.12 1.14	7. b,d.	8 38	General comment: Recommend deleting paragraphs 7 b and d on the nature of interagency bureaucracy and understanding other agencies. These paragraphs provide negative, oversimplified and mainly stereotypical comments that are not useful to achieving interagency cooperation.	Style. Deletion of unnecessary material.	M – Delete 1.12, lines 8 to line 13 as follows: delete sentence beginning with "One of the basic... [through] Otherwise" on line 13. Pick up with sentence beginning

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
									“Interagency coordination processes tend...” ALSO: Delete b.(4). (1.13, lines 7-18). ALSO Delete all of subpara d (1.14 line 38 to 1.15 line 45).
135.	62	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.13		39	He knew the US Ambassador-designate to Kuwait, Edward “Skip” Gnehm, and was able to recruit Major <u>Andrews</u> Natsios, USAR, whose civilian job was Director of USAID’s Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance.	FYI, Andrew Natsios is now the Administrator of USAID	A
136.	63	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.14	7c	4.08	The various elements — Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, Defense agencies and DOD field activities, Military Departments, and combatant commands — should <u>develop a common position on the appropriate military role in an interagency operation before broadening the discussion to include agree to the ends, ways, and means of an operation before trying to integrate the military instrument of power with other agencies, departments, and organizations.</u>	In the end, the NSC should tell all USG agencies what the ends of the entire operation are, as well as the ends for the tasks parceled out to each agency. It’s not for us to decide each within our own agencies, although we should certainly attempt to develop common positions within our agencies before taking the discussion to the rest of the USG.	A
137.	8	EUCOM	A	1.14	d.(1)	44.45	Change: “What one agency views as “by the book,” or “slow and bureaucratic,” may be perceived by other agencies as “fast and loose” or “flexible and responsive.” Back To Original Draft Language of: <u>“What one agency views as “by the book,” another may see as “slow and bureaucratic”. “fast and loose” to one is “flexible and responsive” to another.”</u>	Conveys correct thought.	OBE by Army comment deleting this material
138.	24	USN	A	1.16		1.20	Change as follows: e. Establishing Unifying Goals. Reaching consensus on a	Consistency	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>unifying goals is an important prerequisite for successful interagency operations. Consensus must be constantly nurtured, which is much more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time. At the national level, this consensus is usually attained by the NSC staff and often <u>usually</u> results in an <u>NSC committee meeting Statement of Conclusions, an NSPD, or a POLMIL plan explaining establishing</u> the goals of an operation and establishing interagency responsibilities. Some compromise that limits the freedom of individual agencies may be required to gain consensus. The greater the number of agencies and the more diversified the goals, the more difficult it is to reach consensus. A crisis — such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the plight of the Kurds, the flooding of Bangladesh, or the acts of terrorism of 11 September, 2001 against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center — increases the likelihood that compromises will be made and a consensus can be reached. Because a common unifying goal is so important, a great deal of time is spent on clarifying and restating the goals. Because a common threat brings a coalition together, the differences often revolve around ways and means. Many techniques that have been developed in coalition operations <u>that can be used to facilitate interagency operations cooperation.</u></p>	<p>Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term</p> <p>Removes redundancy</p> <p>May need to add dates to more clearly and accurately identify which crises we are addressing.</p> <p>Grammar</p> <p>Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term</p>	
139.	64	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.16	7e	5.07	At the national level, this consensus is usually attained by the NSC staff and often <u>usually</u> results in an <u>NSC committee meeting Statement of Conclusions, an NSPD, or a POLMIL plan</u> explaining the goals of an operation and establishing interagency responsibilities.	More complete description of how interagency goals for an operation may be disseminated.	OBE by Navy 24 (used most of this...)
140.	7	USAF	S	1.16	7e	11.13	Change to read: A crisis – such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the plight of the Kurds, the flooding of Bangladesh, or the <u>11 Sep 2001</u> acts of terrorism against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center — increases the likelihood that compromises will be made and a consensus can be reached	Rewording avoids neglecting the victims of the plane that crashed in Shanksville, PA.	OBE Navy 24
141.	25	USN	S	1.16		27.28	Change as follows: These must be considered to ensure total <u>facilitate</u> interagency cooperation.	<p>More accurate</p> <p>We can never “ensure”</p> <p>“Total” is a goal that is seldom</p>	A

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								achieved	
142.	27	USN	A	1.16 to 1.17		40 to 2	Change as follows: The purpose of such recognition is to wed all of the engaged agencies to the process by validating and reinforcing their positive interagency participation. (The following Appendixes in Vol II of this publication describe the authority, responsibilities, organization, capabilities and core competencies, and pertinent contact information for many of these agencies, departments, and organizations: Appendix A, "US Government Agencies," Appendix B, "Nongovernmental Organizations," Appendix C, "Regional and International Organizations," Appendix D, "Agency Capabilities and Resources—Quick Look," and Appendix H, "Interagency Telephone and Facsimile Number Listing.")	Simplicity	A
143.	30	USN	A	1.17		12.13	Long and short term objectives should have connectivity and the combatant commander must organize the command to deal with each successfully.	What is the purpose of this paragraph	A
144.	65	DOS PM/PPP	A	1.17	7g	5.06	Participants should not lose sight of establishing a continuing relationship in deference to the issue at hand.	This sentence really sounds funny, and I don't know what it means.	A
145.	66	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.17	8	29	8. Building Interagency, <u>NGO</u> and <u>IGO</u> Coordination	Consistent with Comment 1	A
146.	67	DOS PM/PPP	A	1.17	8a.8b	31.41	a. Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with competing priorities and procedures is a daunting task. Accordingly, many agencies and organizations often operate employing 'management,' 'direction,' or 'coordination' rather than 'command.' b. While Chapter III, "Organizing for Successful Interagency Operations," of this publication details organizing for successful interagency operations, the following basic steps support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination:	Struck-through sentence makes no sense in this context. Recommend eliminating and consolidated sub-paragraphs a and b into one paragraph.	A
147.	29	USN	A	1.17		39.41	Change as follows: b. While Chapter III, "Organizing for Successful Interagency Operations," of this publication details organizing for successful interagency operations, the following basic support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination:	Simplicity	A
148.	68	DOS	S	1.18	8b(1)	2.05	The early development of options for interagency	Consistent with Comment 1,	M –

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
		PM/CPP					<p>consideration by all relevant agencies is particularly important necessary. These options may be developed by creating an interagency multi-agency assessment team capable of quick dispatch to the crisis area to work with the combatant commander...</p> <p>M – starting at page 1.17, line 45: <u>Appropriate representatives</u> from each major group of relevant agencies, departments, and organizations, to include field offices, should be involved in <u>all levels of appropriate</u> planning from the outset. These representatives are especially important in order to achieve unity of effort during this problem definition phase. The early development of options for interagency consideration is necessary. This may include the deployment of These options may be developed by creating an interagency assessment team capable of quick dispatch to the crisis area to work with the combatant commander, ambassador(s), or local and state authorities, to assess the situation.</p>	trying to avoid using “interagency” in cases where it could actually also mean NGOs and IGOs.	
149.	31	USN	M	1.18		7.12	<p>Change as follows: (2) <u>Define Understand the Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria for each involved organization or agency.</u> Within the context of interagency operations, Commanders and decision makers should seek a clearly defined end state supported by attainable objectives and transition criteria. Successful interagency coordination is essential to achieve these goals and to develop accurate and timely assessments. Such definition allows application of resources from the most appropriate agencies.</p>	<p>More accurate.</p> <p>We are not just interested in the JFC’s objectives, end state, or transition criteria.</p> <p>Additionally some of these are set at a higher level than the JFC.</p>	A
150.	69	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.18	8b(2)	10.11	<p>Successful interagency multi-agency coordination is essential to achieve these goals and to develop accurate and timely assessments.</p>	Consistent with Comment 1, trying to avoid using “interagency” in cases where it could actually also mean NGOs and IGOs.	M – delete the sentence entirely.
151.	70	DOS PM/CPP	S	1.18	8b(2)	12.15	<p>Not all agencies <u>organizations</u> will necessarily understand or agree to clearly define the objective with the <u>same</u> sense of urgency or specificity of military planners.</p> <p>M – Not all agencies <u>and organizations</u> will necessarily understand or agree to clearly define the objective with the <u>same</u> sense of</p>	Consistent with Comment 1, trying to avoid using “agency” when nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations are also implied.	M

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							urgency or specificity of military planners.		
152.	71	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.18	8b(2)	14.19	For example, the DOS may appear to resist defining a set of <u>concrete</u> objectives, as since this may can inhibit the give and take necessary to resolve the political problems that are associated with many operations. From the DOS viewpoint, the objective may emerge clearly only in the course of political negotiations and may not be established in complete detail beforehand.	Emphasize that political negotiations often rely on some ambiguity to achieve a settlement.	A
153.	32	USN	S	1.18		24	Add new subpara (3) as follows (and renumber subsequent subparagraphs): (3) Understand the differences between US national objectives, end state and transition criteria and those of IGOs and NGOs. Although appropriate IGOs and NGOs organizations may participate in some level in defining the problem ultimately their goals and objectives are independent of our own.	Clarity	A
154.	72	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.18	8b(3)	25.26	The interagency, <u>NGO and IGO environments is are often</u> complicated by differences in terminology and – <u>in the case of foreign organizations</u> – the use of English as a second language. M – The interagency, environment is complicated by d Differences in terminology and – <u>in the case of foreign organizations</u> – the use of English as a second language <u>complicate coordination</u> .	Consistent with Comment 1, reinforcing the distinction between USG agencies and NGOs/IGOs.	M
155.	73	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.18	8b(3)	29.30	The semantic differences commonly experienced among the Services grows markedly in the interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> arenas.	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
156.	74	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.18	8b(3)	34.36	Different operating procedures, bureaucratic cultures, and language differences can create similar problems during multinational operations.	This isn't the JP for multinational operations. The sentence unhelpfully broadens the discussion.	A
157.	75	DOS PM/PPP	S	1.19	8b(4)	2.03	The military planner or commander's voice may will be but one among many at the interagency table.	By definition, there must be more than one agency represented at "the interagency table."	A
158.	33	USN	A	1.19		5.11	Change as follows: (5) Capitalize on Experience. Review the after action reports and lessons learned using the Joint and Service's Universal Lessons Learned Systems or the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Navy Lessons Learned System, the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Air Force Center for	Simplicity If you feel you have to mention each specific one that place in a figure and provide URLs for the NIPRNet and SIPRNet sites.	A

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							Knowledge Sharing, US Coast Guard Standing After Action Information and Lesson Learned System (http://lintra.comdt.uscg.mil), and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to assess proposed COAs and to reduce the requirement to relearn on the job.		
159.	76	DOS PM/CP	S	1.19	8b(5)	5.11	Review the after action reports and lessons learned using the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System or the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Navy Lessons Learned System, the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Air Force Center for Knowledge Sharing, US Coast Guard Standing After Action Information and Lesson Learned System (http://lintra.comdt.uscg.mil), and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to assess proposed COAs and to reduce the requirement to relearn on the job.	PKI has been renamed.	OBE by USN 33 (accepted the addition)
160.	8	USA	A	1.19		10	Delete email address.	These change with great frequency and is likely easily found using a search engine.	A
161.	77	DOS PM/CP	S	1.19	8b(6)	16.17	When all participants in the interagency decision-making process understand what needs to be done, agree upon the means to accomplish it and identify who will do what through policy-operations coordination. A common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution will help achieve unity of effort. M - <u>A common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution is achievable w</u> When all participants in the interagency process understand what needs to be done, and agree upon the means to accomplish it and identify who will do what through policy-operations coordination. A common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution will help achieve unity of effort.	Consistent with Comment 1, trying to avoid using “interagency” in cases where it could actually also mean NGOs and IGOs.	M
162.	32	USN	S	1.19		16.18	Delete: When all participants in the interagency process understand what needs to be done, agree upon the means to accomplish it, and identify who will do what through policy-operations coordination.	Incomplete sentence. Rewrite disconnected the original thought. Not sure this is required anymore – we don’t want to preach we want to provide guidance and useful information	A

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163.	5A	USN	M	2.01		35	Due to the parochial diverse interests of individual agencies,...	Unnecessarily derogatory.	A
164.	9	EUCOM	A	2.19	b	21	Clarify that while regional approach "mirrors" that of other agencies, division of regions is not the same (ie. - DOS bureaus do not correspond to UCP) M – The combatant commander's regional focus is mirrored <u>paralleled</u> at the DOS in its geographic bureaus.	Potentially confusing	M
165.	78	DOS PM/CP	S	1.19	8b(6)	21.23	To receive proper reimbursement from other USG agencies <u>or IGOs</u> for materiel support, careful responsibility and accounting procedures should be established.	Reimbursement agreements may also be concluded with IGOs.	A
166.	79	DOS PM/CP	S	1.19	8b(7)	30.32	(7) Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions. <u>In most multi-agency operations, civilian organizations will remain engaged long after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the area of operations. Therefore,</u> p Prior to employing military forces, it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military to nonmilitary entities.	Inserted sentence better introduces the rationale behind this paragraph.	A
167.	9	USA	S	1.19		37	Delete "Particularly during MOOTW," Not sure I buy MOOTW will go away	MOOTW will likely be written out of the doctrine lexicon with the consolidation of JPs 3-0 and 3-07.	A – sentence is ok w/o the phrase but it remains to be seen how the MOOTW issue will play out in joint doctrine
168.	80	DOS PM/CP	S	1.20	9	33	9. Media Impact on Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Coordination	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
169.	81	DOS PM/CP	S	1.20	9	42.43	The <u>USG White House Office of Global Communications</u> is will be the lead agency in <u>for</u> developing the national communications strategy.	Clearly the entire USG is not a "lead agency".	A
170.	7	J8 FD	A	1.21			The use of the term "RO" is unnecessarily confusing to the reader. The term "IGO" should be sufficient. If the fact that an alliance is involved needs to be emphasized, then the proper term is "ITO" (International TREATY Organization; e.g., NATO – North Atlantic TREATY ORGANIZATION).	Accuracy.	???? can't find this one on page I-19 The term

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									RO was used on this page in the last draft but it was dropped.
171.	34	USN	S	1.21		8.10	Change as follows: Planners <u>Commanders</u> should identify appropriate spokespersons to address the media. Plans should include when, how, and from which locations spokespersons will address media.	Accuracy Commanders not planners responsibility	A
172.	82	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.01	0	0	ESTABLISHED INTERAGENCY, NGO AND IGO RELATIONSHIPS	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
173.	83	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.01	1	11.12	Responding to the challenges facing the nation today most often almost inevitably requires a multi-agency, interdisciplinary approach...	Believe this is more accurate and reads better.	A
174.	35	USN	S	2.01		16.18	Change as follows: The continually changing global civil-military security environment calls for requires increased and improved organizational connectivity <u>communications and coordination</u> between <u>the numerous</u> agencies <u>and organizations performing their roles as part of all the instruments of national power</u> working to achieve established national security objectives.	More accurate and easily understood	A
175.	84	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.01	1	16.18	The continually changing global civil-military environment calls for increased and improved organizational connectivity between agencies performing their roles <u>in the application as part of all the instruments of national power in order to</u> achieve national security objectives.	Believe this reads better	OBE by USN 85
176.	85	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.01	1	23.24	The discussion then addresses the interagency coordination with public and private national and international NGOs and IGOs.	Consistent with Comment 1, avoid using “interagency” when non-USG organizations are meant. Also, NGOs are by definition “private”, and IGOs are by definition “public.”	A
177.	86	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.01	2b	39.42	b. Reinforced by <u>Due to</u> the parochial interests of individual agencies, previous efforts at interagency coordination have failed for lack of a national-level perspectives, a staff for continuity, and adequate understanding <u>appreciation</u> of the need for <u>an institutionalized coordination</u> the process.	Reads better.	A
178.	36	USN	A	2.02		2.03	Insert appropriate space between the end of subparagraph 2.b and 2.c.	Format	A

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179.	2	J-5	A	2.02	c.	39	Remove (SecDef) . M- ... the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) .	The other secretary's mentioned in the paragraph do not have their titles abbreviated.	M Must follow acronym usage rules. SecDef was established on page I-7. It must be used after that...
180.	3	J-5	A	2.02	c.	40	Remove (CJCS)	The other principals mentioned in the paragraph do not have their titles abbreviated.	R – this is the first usage of the title/term and the abbreviation is used later in the pub...
181.	87	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.02	3a	14.17	a. The functions, membership, and responsibilities of the NSC and its advisory bodies are set forth in NSA 47 (as amended) were updated <u>most recently</u> on February 13, 2001 in NSPD-1, Subject: Organization of the National Security Council System.	Every administration has done their bit to tweak the system. NSPD-1 is just the most recent example.	A
182.	8	USAF	M	2.02	3c	39	Insert " <u>Secretary of Homeland Security</u> " as a member of the NSC.	According to Annex K of Appendix A in Vol II of this JP, the Secretary of Homeland Security is a member of the NSC,	A
183.	89	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.03		F2.01	DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	In DOS column, Deputies' Committee row, wrong title.	A
184.	88	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.03	3d	12.14	NSPD-1 identifies <u>establishes</u> three <u>levels of formal primary interagency committees for coordinating and making decisions on advisory bodies within the NSCS as the forum for consideration of</u> national security issues.	More accurate.	A
185.	90	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.04	3d(3)	16.17	Each NSC/PCC is chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank designated by the Secretary of State .	Inaccurate. SecState does not designate the chairs of PCCs that are chaired by other agencies, e.g. the Department of Transportation	A

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								or DOD.	
186.	91	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.04	3d(3) (b)	27.28	Of <u>particular</u> significance in CCOs is the NSC/PCC for Contingency Planning, which that manages the interagency process for preparation and review of POLMIL plans.	More accurate.	A
187.	4	J-5	S	2.07	f. 2	20	Clarify “When military activities” to read When the combatant commands... the Joint Staff in concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense routinely accomplishes that coordination. M – When military activities <u>combatant commands</u> require interagency coordination, the Joint Staff <u>in concert with the Office of the SecDef</u> routinely accomplishes that coordination.	With the formalization of the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups by SecDef, it is very important to keep OSD engaged in the interagency.	M
188.	37	USN	A	2.07 to 2.08		45 to 2	Change as follows: g. The Combatant Commanders’ Role in the NSCS. While the combatant commanders function under the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the Unified Command Plan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff represents the concerns of the combatant commanders in the NSCS. These concerns are determined through direct communications between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders and their respective staffs. Just as the Joint Staff routinely deals with intradepartmental issues, the formulation of military advice and the representation of combatant command concerns will be accomplished by members of the Joint Staff through coordination with the combatant command. Combatant commanders may communicate with the Deputies Committee during development of the POLMIL plan via the with the Joint Staff in a coordinating role between strategic and operational level planning.	This para is supposed to address the combatant commanders role in the NSCS. It isn’t about the joint staff’s role (that was para f.). Combatant commanders don’t go via the JS. Its confusing – do you mean the JS’s role in planning? Text implied combatant commanders work at the operational level while the joint staff works the strategic level. This is incorrect. Combatant commanders work on both levels.	A
189.	10	USA	M	2.08 to 2.19	4, 5, 6	5 to 5	See Input at end of matrix.	This section addresses domestic operations more appropriately addressed in JP 3-26. The entire section has been reduced in size so as to ensure minimal redundancy and to prevent needless work to align similar material. References to domestic operations have been changed to civil support (consistency with JP	A

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								3-26), references to JTF's are left to JP 3-26 (missions are still evolving and will be finalized by USNORTHCOM), and the Department of HLD has been updated to reflect the ASD(HD). Missions recommended are consistent with JP 3-26. The description of consequence management has been enlarged to make it consistent with the consideration in JP 3-26.	
190.	92	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.08	4	5	4. Federal Interagency Coordination: <u>Coordination of Domestic Operations with Federal Authorities</u>	Parallels title of next section.	OBE by Army rewrite above
191.	2	J8/JRO	M	2.08		12	The US military often provides DOD support to civil authorities during domestic emergencies or major disasters, or in support of civilian law enforcement agencies. This response capability is known as civil support (CS). Civil support operations will usually follow a Presidential designation of a Federal Disaster Area or a Federal State of Emergency and include the efforts and resources of other Federal agencies, state and local governments, and NGOs. When the military responds to emergencies or major disasters, <u>whether man made or natural</u> it will be in support of another a LFA and as many as 9 other Federal agencies in accordance with the FRP.	Provides for all inclusive response even to natural disasters. Note – includes NRP vice FRP issue – see below & previous comments	OBE by Army rewrite above
192.	3	J8/JRO	S	2.08		14	When the military responds to emergencies or major disasters, it will be in support of another a LFA and as many as 9 other Federal agencies in accordance with the FRP <u>NRP</u> .	The FRP was changed to NRP this year after the Department of Homeland Security decided to centralize planning and restructure plans.	OBE by Army rewrite above NRP not approved yet.
193.	38	USN	A	2.08		17	Add: <u>For additional information see the JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security and JP 3-57, Joint doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.</u>	Provides additional reference to Pub user facilitating the search for relevant information	OBE by Army rewrite above

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194.	2	USMC	A	2.08		21	Change to read: "...response support which is delegated to the FEMA."	Grammar.	OBE by Army rewrite above
195.	4	JRO	M	2.10	d.	23.32	<p>"d. The Secretary of Defense determined that certain chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) situations may be qualitatively and quantitatively different than other situations, and DOD response might require special management procedures and channels. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has the responsibility to determine whether or not the CBRNE situation warrants special management. If so, the Joint Staff will translate the Secretary of Defense decision into military orders for those CBRNE events, under the oversight of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict). If not, the Secretary of the Army will exercise authority as the DOD Executive Agent through the normal Director of Military Support (DOMS) military support to civil authorities (MSCA) procedures. <u>In January 2003, pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, the Secretary of Defense established, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)). In addition to overseeing homeland defense activities, the Secretary of Defense has vested the roles and responsibilities associated with the DOD Executive Agent for MSCA and MACDIS with the ASD/HD. The Secretary of Defense also transferred the functions and associated resources of the Army's Office of Director of Military Support (DOMS) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This staff section resides in the J-3, Current Operations Directorate and is known as the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS). The ASD/HD exercises policy for DOD CS missions. JDOMS produces military orders and the appropriate military commander will exercise C2 of military forces.</u>"</p>	DOMS has relocated and the functions are now performed by ASD/HD.	OBE by Army rewrite above
196.	39	USN	M	2.10		29.41	<p>Delete: e. Campaign Planning Within Interagency Operations. Campaign planning generally applies to the conduct of combat operations, but Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs may develop campaign plans for MOOTW. A joint campaign plan is based on the commander's concept, which presents a broad vision of</p>	<p>Waste of words – let's get to the point.</p> <p>Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term.</p>	OBE by Army rewrite above

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							the required aim or end state, and how operations will be sequenced and synchronized to achieve objectives. Thus, a campaign plan is an essential tool for laying out a clear, definable path linking the mission to the desired end state. Such a plan enables commanders to help political leaders visualize operational requirements for achieving objectives. Given the systematic military approach to problem solving, it is often the combatant commander who formally or informally functions as the lead organizer of many operations.		
197.	3	USMC	S	2.10		30.32	General comment. "If not, the Secretary of the Army will exercise authority as the DOD Executive Agent through the normal Director of Military Support (DOMS) military support to civil authorities (MSCA) procedures." This sentence should be rewritten to reflect the current organization of JDOMS vice DOMS.	Accuracy.	OBE by Army rewrite above
198.	9	USAF	M	2.10	d	31	General Comment. This paragraph refers to the Secretary of the Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS) while Page 4-07 of JP 3-26 states that Army's DOMS functions and resources have been transferred to the JCS (e.g. to JDOMS). This requires clarification throughout both JP 3-26 & JP 3-08.	Self-explanatory.	OBE by Army rewrite above
199.	10	USAF	S	2.10	4f	40.02	Change to read, "Acting through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense approves an execute order <u>that designates who will be the supported combatant commander.</u> "	Argument could be made that USTRANSCOM/CC, USSOCOM/CC or USSOUTHCOM/CC could be designated as the supported commander depending on the scenario.	OBE by Army rewrite above
200.	11	USAF	S	2.11	(3)	16 & 21	Change to read: "...through their the Army Component, <u>United States Army</u> Forces Command (FORSCOM) or a..." Then, on Line 21, change " United States Army Forces Command " to " <u>FORSCOM.</u> "	Editorial.	OBE by Army rewrite above
201.	4	USMC	S	2.11		16.17	General comment. Is the terminology for a CONUSA still applicable today? "...approved DEPORD, through the Army Component Forces Command or a Continental United States Army (CONUSA), can provide a JTF HQ. The CONUSAs are regionally oriented..."		OBE by Army rewrite above
202.	5	J8/JRO	A	2.11		42	Examples include flooding, and radiological, and hazardous material accidents or incidents.	Provides streamlined grouping of information.	A
203.	2	NORAD	S	2.12	4h	12-19	Paragraph should include a description of the standing relationship between NORAD and the FAA for providing for	Inclusion of a significant daily domestic interagency relationship.	Noted – Request

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							timely detection of air threats to North America. Include pertinent discussion showing that besides the military assisting civilian organizations, interagency coordination offers capabilities of non-military organizations in support of military objectives (i.e. air defense).		NORAD/ USNORTH COM provide specific line-in/line-out verbiage
204.	6	J8/JRO	A	2.12		19	of equipment and personnel and for reimbursement of operational costs.	Unnecessary.	OBE by Army rewrite above
205.	5	USMC	S	2.13		8	Change to read: “...(MSCLEA) includes military assistance for civil disturbances <u>MACDIS.</u> ”	Acronym first used on page 2-9.	OBE by Army rewrite above
206.	12	USAF	M	2.14	J1 and j2	28 & 35	General comment: The terms Crisis Management and Consequence Management and the text descriptions that follow should be replaced by the overarching term incident management.	The National Strategy for Homeland Security articulates a gap between the two concepts and endeavors to eliminate it by replacing the outdated terms crisis management and consequence management with incident management.	OBE by Army rewrite above
207.	40	USN	S	2.15		9.12	GENERAL COMMENT: Is this complete and accurate or may there be other command relationship options (OPCON, support, etc?) Original text: In its role as the USNORTHCOM standing JTF HQ for CBRNE CM, the JTF-CS works closely with FEMA. When directed by the Secretary of Defense and the supported combatant commander, DOD forces (less United States Special Operations Command and USACE) responding to CBRNE incidents will be attached to JTF-CS.	Accuracy Attached to JTF-CS just seems so limiting	OBE by Army rewrite above
208.	12	EUCOM	A	2.15		41,42	Change Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to <u>Bureau for Citizenship Immigration Services (BCIS)</u>	Correctness. The INS is now under the Department of Homeland Security and its name was changed to BCIS in early 2003.	OBE by Army rewrite above
209.	93	DOS PM/CP	A	2.16	5	1	Department of Defense Coordination of Domestic Operations with State and Local Authorities	Brevity. DOD is implicit.	OBE by Army rewrite

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									above
210.	7	J8/JRO	A	2.16		7	DOD interaction with state and local authorities can take the very visible form of MSCA or the more routine involvement of commanders of DOD installations with state, county, and municipal governments.	Verbose wording.	OBE by Army rewrite above
211.	8	J8/JRO	A	2.17		10	States may also assist other states through the use of interstate compacts <u>agreements</u> .	Use a more understandable term.	OBE by Army rewrite above
212.	6	USMC	A	2.17		36.37	Change to read: "...or emergency, Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) represent..."	Terms are not capitalized in this usage.	OBE by Army rewrite above
213.	7	USMC	S	2.17		43	Change to read: "...Department of Homeland Security was formed in accordance with HR5005 <u>The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296 (PL-107-296)</u> . The primary..."	Correct terminology. HR 5005 only refers to the House Resolution, which is only part of the approval process for a public law.	OBE by Army rewrite above
214.	13	USAF	A	2.17	6a	43	Change to read, "...Department of Homeland Defense <u>Security</u> was formed . . ."	Correctness. There is no Department of Homeland Defense.	OBE by Army rewrite above
215.	3	NORAD	C	2.18	6b	26-30	Sentence overstates USNORTHCOM role. Could be construed from this reference that USNORTHCOM assumed all air missions previously assigned to NORAD, when they specifically did not assume NORADS mission of providing Aerospace control and Aerospace warning for NORAD's AO, or USSTRATCOM's mission of providing space defense. Change to read, "...previously assigned to USJFCOM, specifically land, sea and space defense of the US. Responsibility for aerospace defense of North America rests with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). USNORTHCOM assumed unilateral Non-NORAD air defense mission of the US. ..."	Consistency / accuracy. Provide specific line-in/line-out comments	OBE by Army rewrite above
216.	9	J8/JRO		2.18		5	(3) Minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.	Verbose use of the article "the".	OBE by Army rewrite above
217.	10	J8/JRO	A	2.18		8	(4) Carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.	Verbose and does not contribute to the sentence.	OBE by Army rewrite

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									above
218.	11	EUCOM	A	2.18	6.a. (4)	8	Rewrite sentence to read as follows: “Carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.”	Improves readability	OBE by Army rewrite above
219.	11	J8/JRO	A	2.18		11	(5) Ensure that the functions of the agencies and sub-divisions within the Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress.	Unnecessary.	OBE by Army rewrite above
220.	14	USAF	A	2.18	6b	22	Change to read, “In concert with this <u>the above</u> , DOD . . .”	Clarity. As written, “this” is nondescript . This is a new paragraph and therefore does not indicate what “this” is.	OBE by Army rewrite above
221.	15	USAF	S	2.18	6b	22.30	Change to read: “In concert with this DOD created the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the JFHQ HLS within the USJFCOM . This was followed closely by a change in the Unified Command Plan with the creation of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM assumed missions previously assigned to USJFCOM and North American Aerospace Defense Command , specifically the air, land, sea, and space defense of the US. Today military efforts are effectively — are united under one unified combatant commander - <u>Cdr USNORTHCOM/NORAD</u> .”	DoD did not create JFHQ-HLS. JFCOM created it out of hide after UCP '02 was published. NORTHCOM subsequently absorbed it at IOC and it will soon stand down with JFHQ-North in Colorado Springs in its place. NORTHCOM assumed no NORAD missions - these are governed by a bilateral agreement between the US and Canada. The missions are not unified under NORTHCOM (since NORAD still performs Air Defense) but under a single commander.	OBE by Army rewrite above
222.	8	USMC	S	2.18		26.30	Change to read: “...USNORTHCOM assumed missions previously assigned to USJFCOM and North American Aerospace Defense Command , specifically the air, land, sea, and space defense of the US. <u>USNORTHCOM in the capacity of US Element North American Aerospace Defense Command maintains the mission of air defense of the US.</u> Today military efforts are effectively united under one unified combatant commander – <u>Commander, USNORTHCOM</u> .”	Correct terminology.	OBE by Army rewrite above
223.	17	USAF	S	2.18	6b	31	Recommend adding the following statement at the end of paragraph 6: <u>For further guidance, see JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.</u>	Completeness. Provides a reference.	OBE by Army rewrite above

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224.	5	J-5	A	2.19	c.	1	State “ <u>Complex Contingency Operations</u> ” (CCO) to explain CCO	Complex Contingency Operations (the phrase was deleted in the above paragraph)	R – used first on page I-3, line 10
225.	94	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.19	7c	44.45	c. In a CCO, coordination between DOD and other USG agencies will normally occur within the NSC/PCC and, <u>if directed</u> , during development of the POLMIL plan.	Clarifies that POLMIL plans aren’t always developed.	A
226.	9	USMC	A	2.20		7	Change to read: “The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is an...”	Terms are not capitalized in this usage.	A
227.	95	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.20	7d	9.12	Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the JIACG provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate <u>at the operational level</u> with other USG civilian agencies and departments. <u>JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSCS.</u> Members participate in deliberate, crisis, and transition planning, and provide <u>links back to their parent civilian agencies</u> links to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of <u>civilian</u> USG agencies and departments. acceptance of the JIACG concee.	Further clarify the JIACG concept, providing coordination at the operational level that reaches back to draw upon expertise at parent civilian USG agencies.	A
228.	11	USA	A	2.20		15	Delete “ acceptance of the JIACG concee. ”	Sentence fragment.	A
229.	18	USAF	S	2.20	7d	15	Need to either delete or complete the thought associated with the following sentence fragment: “... acceptance of the JIACG concee. ”	Rectify sentence fragment.	A
230.	6	J-5	A	2.20	d.	15	Continue to line out “ acceptance of the JIACG concee ”	Phrase does not belong.	A
231.	12	USA	S	2.20		32	Replace “MOOTW” with “ <u>non-combat operations</u> ”	MOOTW will likely be written out of the doctrine lexicon with the consolidation of JPs 3-0 and 3-07.	A
232.	16	USAF	S	2.20	c	34	Change to read: “...how operations will be <u>conducted</u> sequenced and synchronized to achieve objectives...”	The JFC's campaign plan should do more than "sequence and synchronize" JTF operations	A
233.	96	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.21	7e(2)	34.35	The commander will be guided by the interagency provisions of the POLMIL plan, <u>when provided</u> , and by Annex V, Interagency Coordination Annex of the combatant commander’s operation plan (OPLAN).	POLMIL plans aren’t always developed.	A
234.	97	DOS PM/PPP	A	2.21	7e(2)	45	Linking the interagency actions with the phases of the operation <u>assists</u> would help in the scheduling and coordination of effort.	Not “it would”, but “it does”.	A
235.	98	DOS	S	2.22		2.04	The development of Annex V is to <u>should</u> enhance early	Clarifies why various USG	A

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		PM/CPP					coordination with planners from the other USG agencies that could be potentially involved in the plan <u>may be involved in the operation's execution or its policy context.</u>	agencies might be involved in plan development.	
236.	99	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.22		4.06	During deliberate interagency planning, heavy combatant command involvement, participation, and coordination will be the key critical to success.	Key, but not the only key.	A
237.	7	J-5	S	2.22	F	14	After the word JIACG Remove " if activated " and change the A at the beginning of the sentence to be " <u>The</u> "	SecDef has approved the JIACG initiative at the combatant commands. Approval date was 19 Aug 03	A
238.	100	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.22	7f(1)	34.35	Commanders must ensure that unity of effort with other agencies contributes to <u>the USG's overall</u> strategic aims and objectives.	Emphasize that the strategic aims are those of the whole USG, not those of the combatant commander.	A
239.	19	USAF	S	2.22	7.f.2	39.41	Change to read, "The JTF public affairs officer (PAO) . .with civil affairs, psychological operations . . ."	Psychological operations is a part of information operations which is also listed in this sentence.	OBE by DOS 101
240.	101	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.22	7f(2)	39.43	The JTF public affairs officer (PAO) must coordinate with civil affairs, psychological operations, information operations, <u>embassy public affairs officers</u> , the intelligence community, NGOs, and IOs to develop and deconflict communications strategies and tactics in line with the combatant commander's intent. M – The JTF <u>JFC</u> 's public affairs officer (PAO) must coordinate with civil affairs, psychological operations , information operations, <u>embassy public affairs officers</u> , the intelligence community, NGOs, and IOs to develop and deconflict communications strategies and tactics in line with the combatant commander's <u>JFC's</u> intent.	Don't leave out the operational/tactical level PAO located in the relevant embassy or embassies.	M
241.	102	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.22 to 2.23	7f(2)	45 to 3	USG agencies and organizations must determine and coordinate the best methods to communicate their messages to avoid contradicting each other <u>and present the USG's message coherently.</u>	The goal is more than just avoiding contradiction.	A
242.	2	EUCOM	S	2.23	a	34	Recommend explanation of the COM role NOT be deleted	The intent of the paragraph is to outline "Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries" - not DoD structure in foreign countries. DAOs and SAOs are not "key USG organizations" in the interagency context. Paragraph	M – Delete subpara a. in its entirety. Re-letter subsequent

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								poorly organized as introduction alludes to defining DAO vs. SAO, then proceeds to detail the interagency hierarchy in a foreign country.	subparagraphs.
243.	103	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.23	8a	36.37	The interagency structure will vary widely from county to country.	At this publication's level of detail, the variations from one country to another are not so extreme.	OBE by EUCOM 2
244.	10	USMC	A	2.23		37	Change to read: "...vary widely from country to country. The key..."	Correct spelling.	OBE by EUCOM 2
245.	13	USA	A	2.23	8.a.	37	Change misspelled word " county " to " <u>country</u> ."	Correctness.	OBE by EUCOM 2
246.	104	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.23	8a	37.41	<p>The key <u>USG military</u> organizations in place within most nations include the US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) and the security assistance organization (SAO) (referred to generically as SAO, but called by a variety of specific names, such as Office of Defense Cooperation, largely governed by the preference of the receiving country) — both part of <u>the US embassy's</u> country team.</p> <p>M – Place the material below at page II-25 line 6:</p> <p><u>(3) The key US military organizations in place within most nations include the US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) and the security assistance organization (SAO) (referred to generically as SAO, but called by a variety of specific names, such as Office of Defense Cooperation, largely governed by the preference of the receiving country) — both part of the US embassy's country team. The USDAO and the SAO are key military sources of information for interagency operations in foreign countries. It is important to understand these and other USG agencies in theater.</u></p>	By no stretch of the imagination are the DATT and SAO/ODC the key USG organizations in a foreign country. The sentence is factually correct as edited.	M
247.	105	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.23	8a	42.44	The USDAO and the SAO are key <u>military</u> sources of information for interagency operations in foreign countries. It is important to understand the differences between these and other USG agencies in theater.	Again, the DATT and SAO/ODC are by no means the only resources in country.	OBE by DOS 104
248.	106	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.24	8b	2.06	The ambassador – or chief of mission (COM) when no ambassador is assigned – employs the country team to integrate all aspects of national policy and will normally maintain good contact with the responsible geographic commander and his staff. The COM typically the	COM had not been previously defined. For consistency with subsequent statements, "ambassador" should continue to be used as the sentence subject.	A

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							ambassador when assigned) has authority over all elements of the USG in country...		
249.	107	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.24	8b	7.11	The ambassador has extraordinary authority and a de facto coordinating mechanism that can be fine-tuned on the spot and tailored to each crisis as it arises, based upon the substance of the problem with little need for written rules.	Not clear. Not necessary.	A
250.	14	USA	S	2.24		11.14	Change as follows: “The ambassador functions at both the operational and tactical levels, where provides recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning (CAP) are provided directly to the geographic commander commander and commander of a JTF.”	The ambassador’s actions to the JFC will not likely entail tactical planning input. Best not to relate levels to the ambassador.	A
251.	108	DOS PM/PPP	A	2.24	8b(2)	22.23	The US ambassador and country team are normally in charge of diplomatic <u>political</u> -military activities in countries abroad.	Conventional word usage.	M – delete this sentence in its entirety. Very confusing “...in charge of...”
252.	109	DOS PM/PPP	A	2.24	8b(2)	25.28	In these circumstances, the US ambassador and the country team may have perform complementary activities <u>that</u> (employing the diplomatic instrument of national power) that do not entail control of military forces, however, which remain under command authority of the combatant commander.	Sentence was otherwise long and confusing.	A
253.	110	DOS PM/PPP	A	2.24	8c	30.34	The country team is the senior, in-country, United States coordinating body, headed by the COM, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency <u>in country</u> , as desired by the COM. It includes representatives of all US departments and agencies present in the country.	Clarity. Stricken sentence was redundant.	A
254.	111	DOS PM/PPP	A	2.24	8c(1)	42.43	Delete: Issues arising within the country team can become interagency issues at the national level if they are not resolved locally. M – At line 42 change as follows: <u>Senior members of the country team who represent agencies other than the State Department are normally in routine contact with their parent agencies.</u> Issues arising within the country team can become interagency issues at the national	Repeats sentence at end of next paragraph.	M – we would lose a nuance by accepting this comment. “Local” country team issues

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							level if they are not resolved locally <u>or when they have broader national implications.</u> <u>Delete page II-25 lines 1-4 and renumber the subsequent subparagraphs.</u>		that cannot be resolved would get bumped up to the national level. However, the national level agencies may get involved as a fallout of the routine contact between in-country and parent agencies and they may do so even if the country team is satisfactorily handling the problem.
255.	112	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.25	8c(2)(a)	14.16	The attachés serve report to the ambassador, but and coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters.	Clarify lines of authority over attaches.	A
256.	3	EUCOM	S	2.25	(2)(c)	37	Change: " The USDR will normally be the senior military officer assigned to permanent duty in the country. " To Read: " <u>The USDR will normally be either the senior military officer or the Defense Attache assigned to permanent duty in the country.</u> "	The Defense Attache is the USDR in every country in the USEUCOM AOR with the exception of Turkey. The USDR is not the senior military officer in the following USEUCOM countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Greece, Bosnia.	A
257.	8	J-5	S	2.25	C	37	Remove the words " the senior " and replace with " <u>a</u> " to read "be a military officer.	There are some cases where the USDR may not be the senior	A

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								military officer assigned. Change is required for clarity	
258.	9	J-5	A	2.26	d.-1	15	Remove the words “ if activated ”	SecDef has approved the JIACG initiative and OSD has notified the NSC of their intent to formalize it at each combatant command.	A
259.	113	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.26	8d(1)	16.19	Representing USG agencies at the HQ of the regional and selected functional combatant commands, each JIACG is as a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community.	Typo	A
260.	10	J-5	S	2.26	d.-2	30	Remove the words “ may be assigned ” and change to “ <u>are assigned</u> ”	Each regional combatant command has a POLAD assigned.	A
261.	114	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.26	8d(2)	30.31	Geographic combatant commanders <u>and, increasingly, CJTFs</u> may be assigned a political advisor (POLAD) by the DOS.	For example, CJTF-180 in Afghanistan has a POLAD.	A
262.	115	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.26	8d(2)	31.34	The POLAD provides USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations, and establishes linkages with USG embassies in the AOR and with DOS.	All US embassies belong to the government. Conventional term is “US embassies.”	A
263.	116	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.27	9b	10.12	Although <u>philosophical</u> differences may exist between military forces and NGOs civilian agencies , short-term objectives are frequently very similar.	This paragraph is about NGOs, with whom differences are often much more profound than with civilian USG agencies.	A
264.	117	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.27	9b	12.14	A very important issue to keep in mind when dealing with NGOs is that they <u>will</u> strongly object to <u>any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives being referred to as the military’s “force multipliers”</u> .	It isn’t just the term “force multiplier” that is a problem.	A
265.	118	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.27	9b	14.15	Their mission is humanitarian and <u>probably</u> isn’t <u>intended</u> to assist the military in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, <u>the</u> activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the COA.	Style	R
266.	119	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.27	9c	35.37	While their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, NGOs are important <u>actors</u> in interagency operations. M – Delete this sentence in its entirety...	Style	M
267.	120	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.27	9c	37.39	The sheer number of lives they affect, and the resources they provide, <u>and the moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus</u> enables the NGOs community to wield a	Other reasons why NGOs are influential, not only w/in the USG, but also in the world	A

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							great deal of power influence within the <u>interagency and international communities</u> .	community.	
268.	121	DOS PM/PPP	A	2.27	9c	39.40	In fact, individual organizations are often funded tapped by national and international donor agencies as implementing partners to carry out specific functions.	Style	A
269.	13	EUCOM	A	2.28	9.d.	4	Eliminate first edit of InterAction – InterAction is the correct spelling and capitalization of this organization.	Correctness	A
270.	122	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.28	9e(2)	40.42	(2) While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military transport to move relief supplies to, or sometimes within, the operational area, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous, impartial operations. <u>This is particularly the case if US military forces are a belligerent to a conflict in the operational area. Most NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for personal security, preferring instead to rely upon the good will of the local populace for their safety. Any activity that strips an NGO's appearance of impartiality, such as close collaboration with one particular military force, may well eliminate that organization's primary source of security. Their rationale may be fear of compromising their position with the local populace or NGOs may also avoid cooperation with the military out of suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations.</u>	NGOs may avoid a close relationship with the military for real security reasons – not just because they are inherently prejudiced against the military.	A
271.	123	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.28	9e(2)	42.45	Commanders and their staffs <u>should be sensitive to these concerns and</u> consult these organizations, along with the competent national or international authorities, to identify local <u>conditions that may impact effective military-NGO cooperation issues and concerns that are of mutual concern.</u>	Sentence didn't say much before.	A
272.	124	DOS PM/PPP	S	2.29	10	40	10. The Role of Intergovernmental Global and Regional International Organizations	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
273.	14	EUCOM	A	2.30		1	Change to "these organizations <u>may</u> have well-defined structures, roles and responsibilities and <u>may</u> be equipped with the resources to..." M – These organizations have well defined structures, roles and responsibilities and <u>may</u> be equipped with the resources to..."	Sentence inconsistent with prior examples like the AU and ECOWAS	M
274.	125	DOS PM/PPP	A	2.30	10a (1)	17.22	Mandates are developed through a political process which generally requires compromise, <u>and sometimes results in ambiguity.</u> As <u>with all military operations a result</u> , UN mandates are implemented for execution by US forces	More logical thought flow.	A

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							through orders issued by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.		
275.	126	DOS PM/CPP	S	2.30 to 2.31	10a (2)(b)	44 to 1	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and UNDPKO the International Committee of the Red Cross are often the logical candidates.	ICRC is not a UN agency.	A
276.	20	USAF	S	2.31	3a	21	Change "" Pacific " to " <u>Peaceful</u> ."	Correctness.	A
277.	127	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.32	Picture	Caption	Joint forces support un <u>UN-coordinated</u> peace operations under the command authority of the US commander.	Typo	A
278.	4	NORAD	S	2.32	3b	26	Add paragraph depicting US military support to NORAD – similar to NATO. NORAD bi-national agreement has been in effect for over 45 years, is essential to homeland defense, and also has evolved to depend heavily on inter-agency relationships / support.	Completeness	Concur - Recommend NORAD provide line-in/line-out
279.	15	USA	A	2.33 2.34	(2) & (3)		Para (2) only contains 1 sentence, combine with para (3).	Grammar.	A
280.	128	DOS PM/CPP	A	2.34	10b (3)	9.12	Coordination of US efforts within NATO begins with the Presidential appointment of a PERMREP, who has the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and shall be is a COM under the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 USC 3901 et seq.).	Style	A
281.	42	USN	C	3.01			Change Chapter title as follows: ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS COORDINATION	Interagency operations are undefined & we previously decided not to use this term.	OBE DOS PM/CPP 129
282.	21	USAF	M	3.01	1b	30.31	Change to read: "b. In concert with the NSC, DOD, and the Joint Staff, combatant <u>commands</u> commanders should support interagency coordination and identify mutual objectives through." M "b. In concert with the NSC, DOD, and the Joint Staff, combatant commanders should support interagency coordination and identify mutual objectives through ."	Editorial. If we are going to refer to combatant commanders, we should use "principals" in the other organizations (e.g. SECDEF, CJCS, etc).	M
283.	129	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.01	0	0	<u>ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY, NGO AND IGO OPERATIONS</u> M <u>ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY, NGO AND IGO OPERATIONS COORDINATION</u>	Consistent with Comment 1.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
284.	130	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.01	1a	15.17	a. When campaign, deliberate, or CAP is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized within an interagency context will bear directly on the efficiency and success of the collective effort.	Consistent with Comment 1, delete references to “interagency” when NGOs and IGOs may also be intended.	A
285.	131	DOS PM/CPP	A	3.01	1b(1)	35.37	In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies will have occurred within the NSC, the Office of Department the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and the Joint Staff. M Identify <u>Recognize</u> all USG agencies, departments, NGOs, and IGOs that are or should be involved in the operation. In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies will have occurred within the NSC, the Office of Department the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and the Joint Staff.	Typo	OBE by USAF 22
286.	22	USAF	A	3.01	1 (b) 1	36	Change to read, “. . . occurred within the NSC, the Office of the Department of Defense DOD, the military services, and the Joint Staff.”	Succinctness.	A
287.	43	USN	S	3.01		39	Change as follows: Determine <u>Understand</u> the authoritative interagency hierarchy, to include...	Combatant commanders do not “determine the interagency hierarchy...”	A
288.	132	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.02	1b(3)	16.17	(3) Define the objectives of the response effort. These should be broadly outlined <u>in the statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, PC or DC meetings that authorized the overall USG effort. Within the military chain of command, they are further elaborated</u> in tasking orders by the commander’s intent.	USG objectives are first and foremost a result of decisions taken under the NSCS.	A
289.	133	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.02	1b(4)	19.20	(4) Define COAs for <u>the assigned</u> both theater military tasks, operations and agency activities while striving for operational compatibility <u>with other USG agencies</u> .	As written, the sentence implied that the theater commander would determine COAs for the entire USG effort.	A
290.	43 A	USN	S	3.02		22.26	Change as follows: Cooperate with each agency, department or organization and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays in the overall operation. The understanding of operating principles, legal considerations that may restrict military assistance to civilian law enforcement, POCs, crisis management organization, Presidential direction (if applicable), and issues or tasks that cannot be undertaken that may affect mission success.	There is no “overall operation” when NGOs are considered. The second sentence makes no sense.	A
291.	43 B	USN	S	3.02		37.39	Change as follows: If the obstacles cannot be resolved at the JFC’s level they must immediately be forwarded up the chain	Unnecessary, and the focus of all these subparagraphs was on the	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							of command for resolution.	combatant commander level. Using the generic JFC changes the focus.	
292.	134	DOS PM/CPP	A	3.02	1b(7)	42.44	Determine which agencies, departments, or organizations are committed to provide these resources in order to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the collective effort, and <u>identify</u> what resources are unaccounted for.	Style	A
293.	135	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.02	1b(8)	46.47	(8) Define the desired <u>overall and</u> military and overall end states, <u>plan for the</u> transition from military to civil authority, post conflict or post disaster operations , and <u>develop</u> exit criteria. M - (8) Define the desired military and overall end states, <u>plan for the</u> transition from military to civil authority, post conflict or post disaster operations , and <u>recommend</u> exit criteria.	Sentence was unclear.	M
294.	44	USN	S	3.03		6.07	Change as follows: <u>Coordinate the eEstablishment of</u> interagency assessment teams...	Accuracy	A
295.	136	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.03	2	14	Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Crisis Response: Domestic Operations M Interagency and <u>NGO</u> Crisis Response: Domestic Operations	Consistent with Comment 1.	M – IGO in domestic ops?
296.	11	USMC	S	3.03		20.21	Need to correct the language using DOMS to the correct language of JDOMS. Figures that reference this language should be corrected as well.	Previous comment was accepted	A – Global search & replace
297.	12	USMC	A	3.03		44	Change to read: “...through the FCO at the D disaster F field O office. When...” M Change to read: “The DCO will coordinate DOD support to civilian agencies through the FCO at the D disaster F field O office. <u>(DFO). FEMA sets up a disaster field office in or near the affected area to coordinate federal recovery efforts with those of state and local governments upon federal declaration of a disaster.</u> When...”	Terms are not capitalized in this usage.	M – Accepting the USMC comment and appending the substance of USAF 34
298.	23	USAF	A	3.04	N/A	F3.01	On the left-most vertical column, add the letter “C” to “STRATEGIC” and the letter “L” to “TACTICAL.”	Spelling	A
299.	45	USN	S	3.05		20.22	Delete:	Joint doctrine should not	A

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							Upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order, or at the direction of the combatant commander, the liaison section within the combatant command staff is activated.	proscribe this. A decision to be made by each individual commander	
300.	137	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.06	3	11	Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Crisis Response: Foreign Operations	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
301.	138	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.07		F3.02	Other International <u>Intergovernmental</u> Organizations	Consistent with Comment 2	A
302.	24	USAF	A	3.07	N/A	F3.02	On the left-most vertical column, add the letter “C” to “STRATEGIC”	Spelling	A
303.	46	USN	S	3.07		1.03	Change as follows: Such informal communications greatly facilitate the development of realistic <u>viable</u> COAs, but should not be used to circumvent established, authoritative planning and direction processes.	More consistent with other JP verbiage	A
304.	139	DOS PM/CPP	A	3.08	3b	15.16	As such, they may be structured to follow the conformity of <u>with</u> HN regulations or restrictions, which may conflict with military operations.	Style.	A
305.	140	DOS PM/CPP	A	3.08	3b(1) (c)	42.44	(c) Define coordinating relationships and lines of authority among the military, the embassy or consulate, and USAID, and personnel and others <u>USG and non-USG organizations.</u>	More complete.	A
306.	11	J-5	A	3.10	4.	14.15	Re-write the sentence to read: The combatant commander is also responsible to for provision of supplies for DOD civilians. M The combatant commander is <u>may</u> also <u>be</u> responsible for provision of supplies for certain interagency personnel, i.e. DOD civilians.	DOD civilians are part of DOD and not the interagency. This is a DOD pub, not an interagency-authored publication.	A – see mod at left
307.	47	USN	M	3.10		2.04	Change as follows: The HACC provides the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs, and IOs that may participate at the strategic level in an FHA operation.	Too limiting	A
308.	141	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.10	3b(4)	14.15	The combatant commander is also responsible for provision of supplies for certain interagency personnel, i.e., DOD civilians. <u>On the basis of an interagency Memorandum of Understanding, this responsibility may extend to the support of personnel from other USG agencies as well.</u>	Happens all the time.	OBE J-5 11
309.	142	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.10	3b(5)	45.46	(5) Liaison Section. As in domestic operations, the liaison section in foreign operations is crucial to interagency	Consistent with Comment 1.	A

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							coordination with USG, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations.		
310.	143	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.11	3b(5)	1.04	A liaison section assists the combatant commander by providing a single forum for the coordination of military activities among MNFs, other USG agencies , engaged NGOs and IGOs, the HN and the indigenous population, and IOs .	Clearer and more complete list.	A
311.	144	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.11	3c	12.14	c. USG Agencies and NGO Relationships. Interagency preparation, planning and participation in a CCO should occur at the earliest phases <u>stages</u> of an <u>anticipated</u> operation. Linking Coordinating the actions of USG agency agencies, IGOs and NGO actions with <u>throughout</u> all phases of an operation will assist in the <u>scheduling integration</u> and coordination of <u>the overall</u> effort. M c. USG Agencies and NGO Relationships. Interagency preparation, planning and participation in a CCO should occur at the earliest phases of an <u>anticipated</u> operation. Linking Coordinating the actions of USG agency agencies, IGOs and <u>throughout</u> all phases of an operation will assist in the <u>scheduling integration</u> and coordination of <u>the overall</u> effort.	Believe this is clearer.	M- keep phases
312.	13	USMC	S	3.11		16.17	If NSPD-1 superseded PDD-56, then how is this statement true? “The USG, via the NSC/DC develops and promulgates a POLMIL plan for CCOs in compliance with PDD-56.”	Need to ensure the language is accurate.	OBE DOS 145
313.	145	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.11	3c(1)	16.19	(1) The USG, via the NSC, PC or DC, may develops and promulgates a POLMIL plan for CCOs in compliance <u>accordance</u> with PDD-56 and its NSPD successor. This <u>The NSC, either through the interagency committee system or via the POLMIL plan, will</u> designates a lead government agency for a the <u>the</u> mission to ensure coordination among the various USG agencies.	POLMIL plans aren't always developed. NSC may establish lead agency in other ways.	A
314.	146	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.11	3c(2)	25.28	Combatant commanders may also (and on all CJCS approved plans are directed to) utilize Annex V, “Interagency Coordination,” of OPLANs to request/consider interagency activities and to provide guidance for incorporating the interagency community into military operations. <u>Combatant commanders should coordinate Annex V with the relevant USG agencies via the Joint Staff.</u>	Annex V shouldn't be constructed in a vacuum. Coordinate with the interagency players it describes.	A
315.	147	DOS	S	3.11	3c(2)	28.30	COAs developed by the combatant command staff should	Consistent with Comment 1.	A

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		PM/CPP					consider and incorporate interagency relationships that have been developed with USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs.		
316.	148	DOS PM/CPP	A	3.11	4a	43.44	Military objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, information, and economic objectives or alternatives.	Not sure what “alternatives” means here.	M – delete sentence in its entirety. This has nothing to do with forming the JTF.
317.	149	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.13	4b	14.16	There may be a requirement for civil affairs representation because of their professional knowledge of the functional issues involved, as well as their expertise in dealing with <u>other</u> USG agencies, NGOs, and IOs.	DOD is a USG agency too.	A
318.	150	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.13	4c	39.42	The mission assigned to a JTF will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or more Military Departments but, increasingly, the <u>mutual</u> support of numerous US agencies, and collaboration with NGOs and IOs.	JTF may support other agencies, and other agencies may support the JTF.	A
319.	151	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.14	4d	5.08	Unlike the military, <u>most</u> USG agencies and NGOs are may not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the make the distinction between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, <u>with the result that</u> resulting in JTF personnel will often interfacing with individuals <u>who are</u> coordinating their organization’s activities at more than one level.	More accurate	A
320.	152	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.14	4d	11.13	During CCOs, the JTF HQ provides <u>an important</u> the basis for a unified effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution.	USG also plans and directs. JTF is an important, but not exclusive basis for a unified effort.	A
321.	153	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.14	4d	13.15	Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency involvement, the focal point for <u>tactical level interagency</u> coordination <u>with civilian agencies</u> may occur at the JTF HQ, the CMOC, or the HOC. M Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency involvement, the focal point for <u>operational and tactical level interagency</u> coordination <u>with civilian agencies</u> may occur at the JTF HQ, the CMOC, or the HOC.	Make distinction that interagency coordination takes place at all three operational levels; the JTF is the tactical level.	M
322.	154	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.14	4d	15.18	JTF personnel may also participate actively or as observers in a civilian-led functional coordinating group concentrating on	Struck-through words are redundant and wordy.	A

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							a specific issue or project rather than a military led coordinating group.		
323.	25	USAF	A	3.15	N/A	N/A	Recommend replacing photo with one of better quality.	See comment.	R
324.	155	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.15	5d	11.13	The NSC, DOS, and the combatant commander, the UN, and IOs will provide the regional strategy and an appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations.	The regional strategy will primarily be developed within USG channels only.	A
325.	156	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.15	5e	18.20	The JFC should quickly establish a relationship with the US ambassador, the country team, and the other US agency representatives in country for foreign operations. <u>To the extent that other USG agencies are not present, consideration should be given to placing representatives of relevant USG agencies on the assessment team.</u>	Embassy is a US agency. Last three words of first sentence are unnecessary and wordy.	A
326.	157	DOS PM/CPP		3.16	5e(1)	4.07	Establishing an effective working relationship with the US ambassador to the HN will help in any foreign interagency endeavor. In cases of operations involving more than one country, e Each US mission, as well as the various State Department geographic and functional bureaus involved, will likely bring different concerns to light the table.	Clearer.	A
327.	158	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.16	5e(2)	13.17	Information sharing relationships between the JTF, local and national authorities, the country team, and USG agencies, IGOs and NGOs must be established at the earliest stages of planning. <u>One of the most important ways to facilitate mutually-beneficial information exchange with non-USG agencies is to establish clear guidelines to avoid over-classification of information and to allocate personnel resources to declassifying information as early as operational conditions permit.</u>	This is a common complaint of NGOs that have worked with us on military operations in the past, e.g. in the planning for Afghanistan. They provide open-source information to us, and the next thing you know, it's thrown into a military intelligence report and classified SECRET.	A
328.	159	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.16	5f	24.25	Proximity to the American embassy or US diplomatic mission may enhance military interagency operational capability. M Proximity to the American embassy or US diplomatic mission may enhance military interagency operational capability <u>coordination.</u>	It's all about interagency operations.	M
329.	160	DOS PM/CPP	A	3.17	6d(2)	44.46	(2) During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the UN deployed an organization called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center, which had essentially the same functions as a CMOC and provided a clearinghouse for transmitting CMOC responsibilities to <u>exchanging information between agencies and with the UN.</u>	Clearer.	A
330.	161	DOS	S	3.18	6d(3)	15.16	Many of these organizations consider the CMOC merely as a	Consistent with Comment 1.	A

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		PM/CPP			(c)		venue for informal interagency discussions		
331.	162	DOS PM/CPP	A	3.19	6d(4)	3.04	When a CMOC is established, the CJTF may should invite representatives of other agencies, which may that include the following:	CJTF really should invite these people. It's not a may or may not. Otherwise why establish the CMOC at all?	A
332.	163	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.19	6d(5)	22.24	The location must be distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, regardless if geographically collocated. <u>If security conditions permit, every effort should be made to locate the CMOC "outside the wire" in order to maximize participation by NGOs and IGOs that want to minimize the appearance of close association with military operations.</u>	A very important lesson that is re-emphasized in the AAR from virtually every Civil-Military Operation conducted.	A
333.	164	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.19	6d(6) (b)	39	(b) A JFC cannot dictate direct interagency cooperation among engaged agencies.	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
334.	165	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.19	6d(7)	43.44	(7) A CMOC conducts meetings as required <u>to highlight requirements – especially humanitarian requirements of the population – and to identify organizations able and willing to meet these needs identify components within the interagency forum capable of fulfilling needs.</u>	More accurate and complete explanation.	A
335.	166	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.20		F3.06	Providing interface with <u>State Department Public Affairs officers the US Information Service, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Country Team.</u>	USIS has been integrated into the State Department.	A
336.	167	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.21	6d(8)	13.17	Once established in the JOA and operating primarily from the CMOC, or HOC, if established, liaison teams work to ensure unity of effort in <u>multi-agency interagency</u> actions, foster a better understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, facilitate transfer of vital information, enhance mutual trust, and develop an increased level of teamwork.	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
337.	51	USN	A	3.21		21.23	Change as follows: In multinational operations, liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between national special operations forces units or naval forces.	Simplicity – example not required Services equities fight – why not USAF and USA, USMC and USA, etc.	A
338.	168	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.21	6d(8) (b)	26.29	The likelihood possibility that a JTF may operate with not only traditional allies, but also with nations with whom the US does not have a <u>long</u> history of <u>formal</u> military cooperation, requires the CJTF to plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements.	The added words increase the truth value of the statement. There aren't many nations left with whom we don't have some history of military cooperation.	A
339.	169	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.22	6d(9) (c)	12.14	(c) The HOC coordinates the overall US relief strategy, identifies logistic requirements for the various organizations, and identifies, prioritizes and submits requests for military support <u>to the JTF through the CMOC appropriate agencies. Requests for military support may be submitted to the JTF</u>	Requests for assistance may be directed to any agency represented in the HOC, not just the military.	A

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							<u>through the CMOC.</u>		
340.	170	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.22	6d(9) (d)	16.18	(d) An end state goal of the HOC should be to create an environment in which the HN is self-sufficient in providing for the population's humanitarian needs, and no longer requires intrusive forms of external assistance. UN, NGOs, and IOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the humanitarian relief efforts.	More accurate mission of the HOC, if indeed it is established by the HN, rather than the military.	A
341.	14	USMC	A	3.22		32	Change to read: "...Agency, CIA, <u>National Security Agency</u> NSA, NIMA, and other..."	NSA used in the text of this pub for national security act.	A
342.	171	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.22	7a(2)	39.44	In managing the intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination for a JTF, the effort will <u>may</u> be complicated by nonofficial <u>non-USG</u> civilians, especially members of NGOs and <u>IGOs</u> officials of IOs , who may be being sensitive to the perception that they are being used to gather intelligence. Such sensitivity includes the arguments This sensitivity may be based on the viewpoint that intelligence gathering is a provocative act and damages an individual's claim to impartiality.	Reads better and more accurately.	A
343.	52	USN	A	3.23		10.12	Change as follows: Guidance for the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and international organizations is contained in DODD 5230.11 dated June 16, 1992.	Simplicity More flexible – a change may be published within the lifecycle of this JP	A
344.	172	DOS PM/PPP	A	3.23	7a(3) (b)	20.22	(b) Consideration must also be given to control of sensitive or classified information in forums such as the CMOC that include representatives of other non-USG agencies, NGOs, and IOs.	USG agencies should not be a problem in terms of classified information.	A
345.	15	USMC	A	3.25		36.37	Change to read: "...and staff by the S staff J Judge A Advocate (SJA)."	Terms are not capitalized in this usage.	A
346.	16	USMC	S	3.25		45.46	Change to read: "(1) Domestic <u>Legal</u> authority for US military and USG agency participation and support."	Legality and accuracy. Present version implies the SJA is only advising on the (US) domestic legal basis for the operation. Whereas the SJA must know and advise on both US domestic and international bases for the operations because it will affect all other action.	A
347.	17	USMC	S	3.26		14	Change to read: "(5) Contracting, budget , and fiscal <u>law</u> matters."	Legality and accuracy. Present version is overboard and redundant in part. Changes clarify that the SJA advises on	A

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348.	18	USMC	S	3.26		16	Change to read: “(6) Rules <u>of engagement and rules</u> for use of force/ engagement .”	contract and fiscal law issues. Legality and accuracy. Present version, in an attempt to be brief via a slash, caused critically important terms to become erroneous and misleading. The term "rules of engagement (ROE)" will be used for military operations outside the United States. The term "rules for the use of force (RUF)" will be used for military operations inside the United States. Homeland defense may occur both outside and inside the United States, so both ROE and RUF should be delineated, as is.	A
349.	173	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.26	7f(1)	24.28	(1) At the theater level, PA planning in a CCO or multinational operation includes coordination with USG agencies, NGOs, the ambassador, the country team (<u>particularly the embassy public affairs officer</u>), the HN, national and international media, and media elements of member forces. It is essential that a public affairs and media plan be in place before the operation begins and integrated into the overall OPLAN.		A
350.			A	3.26		28	Change to read: “...OPLAN. The J oint I nformation B ureau (JIB) is...”	terms are not capitalized in this usage.	A
351.	174	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.27	8	8	Interagency, <u>NGO and IGO</u> Information Management	Consistent with Comment 1.	A
352.	175	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.27	8a	10.12	Other USG agencies, NGOs and IOs on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of the military operation or transition to a desired end state. M <u>Other USG agencies</u> , NGOs and <u>IGOs</u> on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of the military operation or transition to a desired end state.	Don't forget the OGAs.	M
353.	176	DOS PM/PPP	S	3.27	8a	12.14	However, the cultures of <u>non-USG</u> these organizations, <u>in particular</u> , differ markedly from the military and there may be a desire on their part to maintain a distance from military	Keep the distinction between USG and non-USG organizations. Have to show the NGOs and	A

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							activities. <u>By attempting to accommodate these concerns and sharing useful information and resources, the CJTF can help encourage active NGO and IGO cooperation in resolving the crisis. Maintaining an open dialogue with NGOs should foster active participation in the interagency team seeking to resolve the crisis. They</u> <u>NGO and locally-stationed IGO personnel</u> are usually well-qualified <u>individuals who</u> with an understanding of the local culture and practices, and have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the people.	IGOs what's in it for them.	
354.	26	USAF	S	3.28	N/A	14.24	Recommend using a more current vignette.	Quoting an NMS from the second term of the Clinton administration tends to marginalize the relevancy and impact.	Noted Please provide vignette
355.	177	DOS PM/CPP	A	3.28	9a	29.35	While numerous humanitarian <u>and complex</u> crises during the previous <u>several years decade plus</u> have provided independent opportunities for military and civilian agencies to <u>exercise their improve readiness and</u> mission skills, there is a <u>clear</u> requirement for continuous integrated <u>interagency</u> planning and training in order to synchronize all components of a US response to a CCO. <u>One key method to institutionalize interagency training is to persistently carry formal exercises well into Phase IV, post-combat operations, rather than ending after the achievement of Phase III objectives.</u>	Style. Added sentence is a key point often made at CMO AARs with interagency and NGO participants.	A
356.	15	EUCOM	A	3.28	9.b.	40	Rewrite sentence to read as follows: “ <u>Type This</u> training before deployment will greatly enhance operational capability.”	Improperly worded sentence.	A
357.	178	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.28	9c	46.47	c. Interagency coordination is <u>also</u> available to <u>US</u> NGOs through an <u>consortium organization</u> called InterAction, which <u>helps</u> represents NGO interests at the national level.	More accurate description of InterAction.	A
358.	179	DOS PM/CPP	A	3.29	9c	2.05	The military <u>and participating NGOs also</u> benefits from this training <u>with by gaining</u> a better understanding of <u>each organization's culture, capabilities and procedures</u> the nature and importance of political input . InterAction has also briefed civil affairs units and US military schools <u>to improve their understanding of NGO activities on the activities of NGOs.</u>	More accurate, complete.	A
359.	180	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.29	9d	7.08	d. Increasingly, interagency training is <u>also</u> available through <u>the senior service schools (including the State Department's Foreign Service Institute) and other civilian institutions.</u> <u>Interagency training is also provided on-the-job through exchange programs between DOD and other USG agencies associated fellowships at senior level colleges, civilian institutions and the DOS's Foreign Service Institute.</u>	More complete information.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
360.	12	J-5	S	3.29	d.	8.	Add. <u>The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the National Defense University to develop an interagency training program for civilian and military personnel assigned or pending assignment to the combatant command Joint Interagency Coordination Groups. Courses will be on a resident or exportable basis with an expanding capability to conduct web-accessible education.</u>	NDU expects the course of instruction to come on line in late FY-04. It is worth mention in the publication.	A – this needs to be rewritten as its a done deal.
361.	1	SOCOM	S	3.29		26.34	DELETE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH.	Presidential Decision Directive 56 was cancelled and superseded by NSPD 1 dtd Feb 01.	R – see DOS 181
362.	181	DOS PM/CPP	S	3.29	9f	26.34	f. PDD-56 and its successor NSPD (not yet approved) <u>recommend requires that a political-military implementation (or POLMIL) plan shall be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating USG actions in a CCO. The POLMIL plan will include a situation assessment and will specify the concept of operations for all agencies, synchronize agency efforts, and provide a game plan for individual agencies to follow. The directives also points to a POLMIL plan rehearsal and the need to for training of mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant Secretary level) interagency personnel in the development and implementation of plans for complex contingencies. DOD has designated the National Defense University as the lead agent for POLMIL planning education, training and AARs related to complex foreign crises.</u>	More accurate information about PDD-56.	A
363.	19	USMC	S	99.00			General comment. The following acronyms are not used two or more times in the text of the pub and should be deleted from the glossary: “CONUSA” based on correct language “DOMS” based upon using correct language	Compliance with JP 1-01.	A
364.	20	USMC	S	99.00			General comment. The following acronyms are used two or more times in the text of the pub and should be added to the glossary: “ICS incident command system” “JTF-CS Joint Task Force-Civil Support” “NSC/PCC National Security Council/Policy Coordination	Compliance with JP 1-01.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<u>Committee</u>		
365.	21	USMC	S	99.02		21	Change to read: “JCMOTF Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force ”	Terms are not capitalized in this usage.	A
366.	16	USA	A	99.02		3	Add to Glossary: “ <u>USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USG)</u> ”	Accuracy and consistency. The USCIS replaced the INS as a new bureau effective 1 Mar 2003.	A
367.	17	USA	A	99.02		28	Delete “ INS Immigration and Naturalization Service ”	Accuracy. INS ceases to exist. The new agency USCIS replaced the INS on 1 Mar 2003.	A
368.	32	USAF	A	99.02	N/A	45	The acronym “NIMA” stands for “National Intelligence Imagery and Mapping Agency” M- Delete NIMA and insert NGA...National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency	Correctness	M
369.	22	USMC	S	99.03		3	Change to read: “ NSA National Security Agency <u>national security act</u> ”	Within the text of this pub NSA is national security act.	A
370.	33	USAF	S	99.03	N/A	1	Add: “ <u>NRP</u> ” and “ <u>National Response Plan.</u> ” M Add “INRP Interim National Response Plan” to glossary	Completeness	M
371.	26	EUCOM	A	99.03		11	Add: “ <u>NSC/PCC National Security Council/Policy Coordinating Committee</u> ”	Abbreviation used throughout, but omitted in the glossary.	A
372.	23	USMC	S	99.05		7.10	Delete term and definition entry for “ centers of gravity ”	Term is not used in this pub.	A
373.	24	USMC	S	99.06		32.39	Delete term and definition entry for “ combat service support ”	Term is not used in this pub.	A
374.	25	USMC	S	99.06		41.42	Delete term and definition entry for “ combat support ”	Term is not used in this pub.	A
375.	18	USA	M	99.07			Add. “ <u>civil support. Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02)</u> ”	Consistency with JP 3-26.	A
376.	26	USMC	S	99.07		8.11	Delete term and definition entry for “ command, control, communications, and computer systems ”	Term is not used in this pub.	A
377.	27	USMC	S	99.07		13.15	Delete term and definition entry for “ common-user airlift service ”	Term is not used in this pub.	A
378.	29	USMC	S	99.07		18.20	No use of term “developmental assistance” in pub. However, there is use of term “developmental civil assistance.”	Need to ensure we are talking about the same thing as defined in	M – delete this term

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								glossary	from the glossary
379.	19	USA	M	99.07		25.30	Change as follows: “consequence management. Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also called CM. (JP 1-02) <u>Actions that comprise those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy. Also called CM. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02)</u> ”	Consistency with JP 3-26.	A
380.	28	USMC	S	99.07		32.37	Delete term and definition entry for “ Continental United States Army ” based on accepting other comments to delete in text of pub.		A
381.	34	USAF	S	99.08	N/A	22	Add the following: “ <u>Disaster Field Office - When a disaster receives a federal declaration, the FEMA sets up a Disaster Field Office (DFO) in or near the affected area to coordinate federal recovery efforts with those of state and local governments.</u> ”	Organization needs to be defined.	R – this is not a definition. It’s a description. However, we used this text in mod to USMC 12 (where DFO is addressed in chapter 3)
382.	30	USMC	S	99.08		35.36	Delete term and definition entry for “ displaced person ”	Term is not used in this pub.	A
383.	31	USMC	S	99.11		27.30	Delete term and definition entry for “ internal defense and development ”	Term is not used in this pub.	A
384.	182	DOS PM/CPP	S	99.11		32.35	international organization. Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national	Replace IO with IGO.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nations agencies. Also called IO. See also nongovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02) <u>intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional or functional basis, for wide-ranging or narrowly-defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. IGOs possess legal personality under international law: they can enter into conventions and treaties; they can sue and be sued; they can possess property; and their staffs enjoy diplomatic status. Examples include the UN, NATO, and the African Union. Often abbreviated IGO.</u>		
385.	32	USMC	S	99.12		27.32	Delete term and definition entry for “ letter of assist ”	Term is not used in this pub.	A
386.	20	USA	S	99.13		8.11	Delete: military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)	MOOTW will likely be written out of the doctrine lexicon with the consolidation of JPs 3-0 and 3-07.	R – will leave its fate to JP 3-0
387.	33	USMC	S	99.13		13.24	Delete term and definition entry for “ military options ”	Term is not used in this pub.	A
388.	183	DOS PM/CP	S	99.14		1.06	nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-US organizations. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02) <u>A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. They may be local, national or transnational; employ thousands of individuals or just a handful; utilize a large management structure or no formal structure at all. Also called NGO. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and definition and will be included in the next edition of JP 1-02)</u>	Old definition is inaccurate.	

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
389.	34	USMC	S	99.14		43.44	Delete term and definition entry for “preventive diplomacy”	Term is not used in this pub.	A

Volume I, Pages 2.08-2.19.(See rationale with comment in Matrix)

4. Federal Interagency Coordination: ~~Domestic Operations~~ Civil Support

a. The US military ~~often~~ provides ~~support~~ assistance to civil authorities on a routine basis. While the most visible support occurs during domestic emergencies or major disasters, the majority of DOD’s support is ~~or~~ in support of civilian law enforcement or intelligence agencies. This assistance ~~response capability~~ is known as civil support (CS) within the defense community because the assistance. ~~When the military responds to emergencies or major disasters, it will always be in support of a LFA and as many as 9 other federal agencies in accordance with the FRP. The r~~Requests for assistance CS from another agency the LFA may be predicated on mutual agreements between agencies or stem from follow a Presidential designation of a Federal Disaster Area or a Federal State of Emergency. The military typically only responds after and include the efforts and resources of other federal agencies, state and local governments, and NGOs have been exhausted or when unique military assets are required.

b. Authorities and funding are the main trigger points for the approval of military support to civil authorities. DOD policy for support and assistance to state and local governments during emergencies, disasters, or civil disturbances is set forth in DOD Directives (DODDs) 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), and 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.

c. The Department of Defense works closely with other Federal agencies in various domestic arenas. In addition to participating in interagency steering groups and councils, DOD is a partner in several national level incident management and emergency response plans such as the Federal Response Plan, the National Contingency Plan, the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), Mass Immigration Emergency Plan, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). Over time, these plans will be consolidated into a National Response Plan.

(1) The Federal Response Plan, January 2003, is the most well-known national interagency plan of which DOD is a signatory. The Federal Response Plan invokes the The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act which provides the authority for the federal government to respond to emergencies and major disasters. The Act gives the President the authority to establish a program for disaster preparedness and response support which is delegated to the FEMA.

~~(1) Following a request for assistance from the Governor of the affected state or territory, and the determination that local ability to respond has been exceeded, the President implements the FRP by declaring an emergency or major disaster. The FRP provides the framework for coordinating the military support to civil authorities. With this Presidential declaration, the resources of the federal government, through the interagency process, are available for support operations.~~

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW

~~At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and caused extensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested Federal assistance. The Secretary of the Army, as the President’s executive agent, directed initiation of disaster relief operations in support of the Federal response plan. As part of those operations, the Commander in Chief, Forces Command, directed the Second US Army to form joint task force (JTF) Andrew and begin humanitarian relief operations. Eventually composed of elements of all Services and both Active and Reserve forces, JTF Andrew began operations on 28 August 1992.~~

~~JTF Andrew’s mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local and line haul transfer operations, and other logistic support to the populace in affected areas. Commander, JTF Andrew, defined success as getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardships until non-DOD Federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normal operations.~~

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JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple Federal, state, and private agencies. These included the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy Scouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations. This disaster relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the Armed Forces of the United States. The training for war that developed and promoted initiative, ingenuity, and flexibility in leadership and conduct of operations, served the Nation well in a noncombat situation. VARIOUS SOURCES

(2) The FRP groups the types of assistance needed during a civil emergency or disaster into 12 emergency support functions (ESFs). Based on core competencies, federal agencies are selected to contribute to ESFs; lead agents are designated as primary agencies while others participate as support agencies. For example, DOD is the primary agency for ESF 3, "Public Works and Engineering," and support agency for the 11 other functions. DOD has designated the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as its operating agent for ESF 3. As the operating agent, the USACE is responsible for planning, preparedness, response, and recovery.

(3) Under the FRP, an approved request for assistance that cannot be met by the ESF's primary agency may be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for assessment. The Secretary of Defense may issue an executive order instructing the appropriate combatant commander to provide the requested support.

e. DOD policy for support and assistance to state and local governments during emergencies, disasters, or civil disturbances is set forth in DOD Directives (DODDs) 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), and 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.

d. The Secretary of Defense determined that certain chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) situations may be qualitatively and quantitatively different than other situations, and DOD response might require special management procedures and channels. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has the responsibility to determine whether or not the CBRNE situation warrants special management. If so, the Joint Staff will translate the Secretary of Defense decision into military orders for those CBRNE events, under the oversight of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict). If not, the Secretary of the Army will exercise authority as the DOD Executive Agent through the normal Director of Military Support (DOMS) military support to civil authorities (MSCA) procedures.

e. During emergency or disaster relief operations, the DOD, in coordination with FEMA, generally supports Federal agencies that have primary ESF responsibility in the FRP. This coordination is effected between the defense coordinating officer (DCO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The DCO is the DOD on scene military point of contact (POC) with FEMA. The FCO is FEMA's focal point for DOD liaison.

(2) The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), May 1, 1996. The FRERP remains the plan to establish an organized and integrated capability for timely, coordinated response by Federal Agencies to peacetime radiological emergencies. The Lead Federal Agency (LFA) is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the Federal response. The DOD is the LFA for emergencies at DOD owned or operated facilities, involving DOD material in transit, or involving DOD spacecraft missions. Additionally, DOD provides radiological resources to include trained response personnel, specialized radiation instruments, mobile instrument calibration, repair capabilities, expertise in site restoration and performs special sampling of airborne contamination on request.

(3) Under The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), January 2001, DOD will provide military assistance to the LFA and/or the CONPLAN primary agencies during all aspects of a terrorist incident when requested by the appropriate authority and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

(4) Operation Distant Shore, Mass Immigration Emergency Plan, June 1994, presents guidelines for a coordinated effort by the Federal government, at the national, regional, and local level, to enforce Federal laws to deter, interdict, and control massive illegal immigration to the United States. The DOD will provide facilities, logistics, medical support, transportation and personnel support to agencies involved in the implementation of the plan.

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(5) The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), September 15, 1994 provides the organizational structure and procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. In the case of a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, where the release is on, or the sole source of the release is from, any facility or vessel under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of DOD, then DOD will be the lead agency.

d. Military forces may also conduct missions to help the DOJ or other Federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) assist Federal, state, or local LEAs. Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA) includes military assistance for civil disturbances. Other types of operations that typically require MSCLEA are, counterdrug, combatting terrorism, general support such as training civilian law enforcement officials, and critical asset assurance. However, the Constitution of the United States, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues all affect the employment of the military in domestic operations. For this reason, requests for MSCLEA should be coordinated with the supporting organization's legal counsel or Staff Judge Advocate. Examples of laws that may impact MSCLEA include:

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act and DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Authorities, provide the authority and defines the conditions under which military forces can be employed, as well as criminal penalties and the legal constraints intended to prevent misuse of military force. With the exception of members of the USCG and members of the National Guard in state service, military personnel are normally prohibited under either the Posse Comitatus Act or DOD policy from direct participation in the execution of civil laws in the United States. ~~The two geographically oriented Joint Interagency Task Forces are examples that illustrate military support to civilian law enforcement by bringing together the resources of participating agencies for execution of the counterdrug strategy under a single commander.~~ Under the provisions of this act and DOD policy, military personnel are prohibited from:

- (a) Participating in the arrest, search and seizure, stop and frisk, or domestic interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles.
- (b) Conducting domestic surveillance or pursuit.
- (c) Operating as informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity.

(2) Preplanned national events may be perceived by adversaries as terrorist targets. Under PDD 62, the NSC, upon the joint recommendation of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, has the authority to designate important public events, such as the 2002 Winter Olympics or the President's Inauguration, as National Security Special Events. Once so designated, an event becomes the focal point for interagency planning and the LFA may request support from the DOD.

~~fe. In most situations, Acting through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense approves an execute order designating the Commander, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) or the Commander, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) will be designated as the supported combatant commander.~~

(1) The supported combatant commanders are DOD principal planning agents and have the responsibility to provide joint planning and execution directives for peacetime assistance rendered by DOD within their assigned AORs.

(2) Once a decision to employ military assets is made, the supported combatant commander uses the capabilities of each component to accomplish the mission. The organization of ~~a JTF~~ the joint force will be based on the capabilities required for the optimum response to the disaster. Frequently, the ~~JTF~~ response will require nontraditional or innovative uses of military resources.

(3) During disaster operations, the ~~The~~ supported combatant commander normally designates a component command or JTF as a HQ to execute the ~~relief~~ operations. Upon issuance of the SecDef deployment order (DEPORD), this HQ will appoint and deploy a DCO and a multifunctional staff of officers referred to as the defense coordinating element. The DCO works with the FCO to integrate DOD efforts in support of the operation and serves as the on-scene military point of contact (POC) for the FCO and principal representatives of other USG agencies and NGOs.

~~(3) Within the continental United States, USNORTHCOM, based upon a SecDef approved DEPORD, through the Army Component Forces Command or a Continental United States Army (CONUSA), can provide a JTF HQ. The CONUSAs are regionally oriented. These HQ interact daily with state and local authorities, the FEMA regions,~~

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~~and other Federal agencies on a variety of issues that provide a foundation for rapid and smooth transition to support operations during periods of disaster response. The Commander, United States Army Forces Command, is designated as Army Service component commander to USNORTHCOM. United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) retains combatant command (command authority) of continental United States based Army forces. Also, USNORTHCOM can appoint Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ HLS) to provide the JTF HQ.~~

(4) FEMA provides supporting combatant commanders with interface to Federal agencies through Regional Interagency Steering Committees for planning, coordinating, and supporting relief efforts. Figure II-4 depicts the incident command system (ICS), a standard model for managing domestic events, and widely used by the civilian sector and FEMA to establish roles and responsibilities when working within the interagency community. The US Coast Guard (USCG) has adopted ICS as its standard response system for nonmilitary incident management. US military forces that might be involved in emergency or major disaster operations may benefit by becoming familiar with the ICS system.

~~gf. In addition to emergency or disaster assistance, DOD assistance may be requested from other agencies as part of homeland security. Such assistance may be in the form of information and intelligence sharing, mapping or a Federal response to domestic environmental disasters. Normally, such assistance will be provided based on requests from the Environmental Protection Agency, the USCG, or Department of the Interior as the lead agency. Examples include flooding and radiological and hazardous material accidents or incidents. USSTRATCOM, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) can utilize space-based sensors to provide significant damage assessment assistance.~~

Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) was formed following a Presidential Executive Order on the evening of 1 May 1992. The Executive Order federalized units of the California National Guard (CAARNG) and authorized active military forces to assist in the restoration of law and order. JTF-LA formed and deployed within twenty-four hours, assembled from US Army and Marine Forces. It operated in a unique domestic disturbance environment, while working with city, county, state, Federal agencies and the CAARNG. VARIOUS SOURCES

~~hg. While DOD response to domestic emergencies is normally coordinated through Secretary of Defense, the military may also respond when an interdepartmental memorandum of agreement (MOA) is in effect. For example, the USCG, initiating under an interdepartmental MOA, is assured of a rapid deployment of oil containment and recovery equipment from the US Navy. The MOA bypasses negotiations at the HQ level and sets forth procedures for deployment and employment of equipment and personnel and for reimbursement of operational costs. This mechanism enabled the rapid deployment of Navy equipment to Prince William Sound in 1989 in response to the Exxon Valdez incident and preceded the much greater DOD assistance effort orchestrated by DOMS.~~

Figure 2.04 RETAIN

~~i. Military forces may also conduct missions to help the DOJ or other Federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) assist Federal, state, or local LEAs. Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA) includes military assistance for civil disturbances. Other types of operations that typically require MSCLEA are, counterdrug, combating terrorism, general support such as training civilian law enforcement officials, and critical asset assurance. However, the Constitution of the United States, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues all affect the employment of the military in domestic operations. For this reason, requests for MSCLEA should be coordinated with the supporting organization's legal counsel or Staff Judge Advocate. Examples of laws that may impact MSCLEA include:~~

~~(1) The Posse Comitatus Act and DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Authorities, provide the authority and defines the conditions under which military forces can be employed, as well as criminal penalties and the legal constraints intended to prevent misuse of military force. With the exception of members of the USCG and members of the National Guard in state service, military personnel are normally prohibited under either the Posse Comitatus Act or DOD policy from direct participation in the execution of civil laws in the United States. The two geographically oriented Joint~~

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~~Interagency Task Forces are examples that illustrate military support to civilian law enforcement by bringing together the resources of participating agencies for execution of the counterdrug strategy under a single commander. Otherwise, military personnel are prohibited from:~~

~~(a) Participating in the arrest, search and seizure, stop and frisk, or domestic interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles. (b) Conducting domestic surveillance or pursuit. (c) Operating as informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity.~~

~~(2) Preplanned national events may be perceived by adversaries as opportunities for the employment of CBRNE. Under PDD 62, the NSC, upon the joint recommendation of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, has the authority to designate important public events, such as the 2002 Winter Olympics or the President's Inauguration, as National Security Special Events. Once so designated, an event becomes the focal point for interagency planning and the LFA may request support from the DOD.~~

~~The war on drugs typifies extremely complex US Government interagency coordination. Counterdrug activities of the United States are a coherent national effort of joint military and civilian cooperation. DOD personnel work with more than 30 Federal agencies and innumerable state, local, and private authorities. The DOD has responsibility as the lead Federal Agency in support of law enforcement agencies for the detection and monitoring of illegal drug shipment into the United States in support of law enforcement agencies. Combatant commanders have responsibility within their respective areas of responsibility to develop strategy for detection and monitoring of land, aerial and maritime modes of drug transportation. Joint interagency task forces bring together the resources of participating agencies for execution of the counterdrug strategy. The Services contribute to the counterdrug effort by providing personnel and equipment support to the combatant commanders for the range of DOD missions. VARIOUS SOURCES~~

~~jg. Because of America's unrivaled military superiority, adversaries of the United States may be more likely to resort to terror and the use of CBRNE instead of conventional military methods. Supporting incidents involving CBRNE may take many forms, to include operations associated with crisis management (CrM) and consequence management (CM).~~

~~(1) Crisis management CrM support occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the federal government with the DOJ, exercised through the FBI, as the LFA assuming primary responsibility in a domestic terrorist threat or incident. DOD support to LFA crisis management involving the employment of CBRNE includes measures to identify, acquire, and employ resources to anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.~~

~~(2) Consequence management involves actions that comprise those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy. measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by CBRNE. Support occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government with the federal government providing assistance when required. DOD support to CM involving the employment of CBRNE comprises USG interagency assistance to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE accident or incident.~~

~~"The United States shall give the highest priority to developing capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical materials or weapons used by terrorists." PDD 39, United States Policy on Counterterrorism~~

~~kh. The US military has acquired extensive experience and developed considerable expertise in protecting its members from CBRNE and in operating in a CBRNE contaminated environment. With the threat now reaching into the domestic arena, this experience and expertise is available to domestic civil authorities. The Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) is a standing JTF HQ organized and trained for a flexible response based on the type of CBRNE incident and support requested by the LFA. In its role as the USNORTHCOM standing JTF HQ for CBRNE CM, the JTF-CS works closely with the FEMA. When directed by the Secretary of Defense and the supported combatant commander, DOD forces (less United States Special Operations Command and USACE) responding to CBRNE incidents will be attached to JTF-CS.~~

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~~(1) A wide array of active components, reserve forces, and government civilians and contractors are identified to provide CBRNE support to the JTF CS. (2) National Guard forces are the Governor's military response organization for CBRNE incidents, but may be Federalized and deployed as an element of the JTF CS.~~

4i. Military commanders should scrutinize, with the assistance of legal counsel when appropriate, each request for domestic aid to ensure that it conforms with statutory limitations, especially in law enforcement assistance to civil authorities. The Secretary of Defense must personally approve any request to assist LEAs in preplanned national events. Increased demand for DOD assets in support of law enforcement will require careful review during the planning phase to ensure that DOD support conforms to legal guidelines and does not degrade the mission capability of combatant commanders.

~~“States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.” US Commission on National Security/21st Century Chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman September 15, 1999~~

~~m. Once a decision to employ military assets is made, the supported combatant commander uses the capabilities of each component to accomplish the mission. The organization of a JTF will be based on the capabilities required for the optimum response to the disaster. Frequently, the JTF response will require nontraditional or innovative uses of military resources.~~

5. Department of Defense Coordination of ~~Domestic Operations~~ Civil Support with State and Local Authorities

a. When a disaster threatens or occurs, and the assets of local and state governments are fully committed, a governor may request federal assistance. DOD may support local and state authorities in a variety of tasks. DOD interaction with state and local authorities can take the very visible form of MSCA or the more routine involvement of commanders of DOD installations with state, county, and municipal governments. ~~These activities include contingency planning with local governments and field offices of federal agencies and community and social activities. With the increased threat of terrorism, and the possibility that an act of terrorism in the form of CBRNE may very quickly overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments, there will be a growing requirement for US military forces to provide increased assistance to state and local governments.~~

b. Army and Air National Guard forces have primary responsibility for providing military assistance in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia in civil emergencies, and are under the command of the state, or territory adjutant general. Reserve personnel may be employed for civil emergencies in a volunteer status, be ordered to active duty for annual training, or be called to active duty. DOD support is generally provided in the form of assistance or augmentation of skills and resources to the Federal agency field office or to a state or local agency having responsibility for a particular activity.

~~“JTF CS officials were in constant contact with New York's adjutant general throughout the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. Had they been needed, the JTF CS could have been on the site almost immediately. New York City had enough resources to handle a tragedy of this scope.” Comments by BG Jerry Grizzle, Commander, JTF CS 32~~

c. The Domestic Preparedness Program was established in 1997 and provided funding for the DOD to train state and local first responders in 120 US cities in CBRNE training, access to federal assistance, and exercises. ~~The JTF CS participates by co-sponsoring exercises.~~

d. US states, territories, and possessions has an office of emergency services (OES) or an equivalent office responsible for preparedness planning and assisting the governor in directing responses to emergencies. The OES coordinates provision of state or territorial assistance to its local governments through authority of the governor or adjutant general. The OES operates the state emergency operations center during a disaster or

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emergency and coordinates with Federal officials for support, if required. The state will usually designate a state coordinating officer (SCO), with similar authorities to the FCO, to coordinate and integrate Federal and state activities. States may also assist other states through the use of interstate compacts.

e. DOD counterpart relationships to those of DCO, FCO, and SCO are established at lower echelons to facilitate coordination. ~~For example, local DOD installation commanders may work closely with local mayors and commissioners to align capabilities and resources with needs.~~ Installation commanders may respond immediately to a request from local or state governments to an emergency which may not be at the level to be a Presidential declared emergency. Installation commanders may respond to support for public fire, search and rescue services, public works, police protection, social services, public health, and hospitals. DOD support for local environmental operations can begin immediately within the authority delegated to installation commanders. ~~One such example is detection of an oil spill in a harbor. If requested by local authorities, a commander of a DOD installation having the appropriate resources can take immediate action, with coordination of state and Federal activities to follow.~~ This immediate response by commanders will not take precedence over their primary mission. Commanders should seek guidance through the chain of command regarding continuing assistance whenever DOD resources are committed under immediate response circumstances. When providing assistance in response to a Presidential-declared disaster or emergency, Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) represent the DOD executive agent, the supported commander, and their own Service.

f. ~~Federal support to LEAs can be coordinated with the state or territory adjutant general, the OES, or principal LEA, depending on the nature and magnitude of the operation. For example, coordination of counterdrug operations under Federal and state oversight can be very low key, with interagency activities taking place within specific localities. In a different sort of operation, support provided during the Los Angeles riots required extensive coordination at several echelons, from the adjutant general to local law enforcement departments and DOD installations.~~

g. ~~When providing assistance in response to a Presidential-declared disaster or emergency, Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) represent the DOD executive agent, the supported commander, and their own Service.~~

6. Homeland Security. ~~a. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)) was created. The ASD(HD) is established within the office of the Under Secretary for Policy and provide overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation of DOD resources for homeland defense and civil support. Responsibilities include: strategic planning; employment policy, guidance and oversight; support to civil authorities in accordance with the Federal Response Plan; assistance to civilian agencies conducting homeland security missions; and when directed, serve as the SecDef's executive agent for homeland defense and homeland security mission areas. The establishment of the ASD(HD) was followed closely by a change in the Unified Command Plan with the creation of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM assumed missions previously assigned to USJFCOM and US Element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command. For further guidance on Civil Support and Homeland Security, see JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security. Department of Homeland Defense was formed in accordance with HR5005. The primary mission of the Department is to:~~

- ~~(1) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.~~
- ~~(2) Reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism.~~
- ~~(3) Minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.~~
- ~~(4) Carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.~~
- ~~(5) Ensure that the functions of the agencies and sub divisions within the Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress.~~
- ~~(6) Ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.~~
- ~~(7) Monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking.~~

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~~b. In concert with this DOD created the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the JFHQ HLS within the USJFCOM. This was followed closely by a change in the Unified Command Plan with the creation of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM assumed missions previously assigned to USJFCOM and North American Aerospace Defense Command, specifically the air, land, sea, and space defense of the US. Today military efforts are effectively united under one unified combatant commander—USNORTHCOM.~~